Wednesday, October 3, 2018

RADICALIZATION AND COUNTER-RADICALIZATION



Published with title - 'Countering The Threat of Radicalisation:Theories, Programmes and Challenges
in Journal of Defence Studies, IDSA
(April 2016 issue, Vol: 10, Issue 2)


“The root cause of terrorism … is the extremist narrative… not poverty or foreign policy.”
-          British Prime Minister David Cameron

For about a decade, the global campaign against terrorism has regarded the dissemination of radical ideologies by various terrorist organizations and religious institutions, as one of the most important reasons for the spread of terrorism. Therefore, over 40 governments around the world have launched indigenously developed counter-radicalization programmes, in keeping their political and socio-cultural conditions, in order to “drain” the proverbial swamp of radical extremism.
In this regard, India has only recently taken cautious and deliberate steps toward building counter-radicalization policy and programmes, which has underscored the need for deeper research and analysis of the subject.
This paper aims to explore the various aspects of counter-radicalization and its role in the larger campaign against terrorism. Given the wide scope of the subject, the paper undertakes a normative and exploratory analytical approach. At present, there is little substantive research or empirical study available on the disparate counter-radicalization programmes implemented around the world, which are themselves subject to constant and often drastic changes and revisions.
As most counter-radicalization programmes today are primarily directed toward combating the most immediate and alarming threat posed by Islamic radicalization, this paper covers anti-jihadist radicalization in greater detail.

Contents
In the aftermath of the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings of 2005, the concept of “counter-radicalization” has gained importance in counter-terrorism policy-making as it seeks to explain and counter the process by which ordinary people become willing to carry out acts of mass violence, even against their fellow citizens. However, several social activists and even counter-terrorism experts have expressed apprehensions over the excessive focus on so-called “counter-radicalization” measures and criticize the very premise of the “radicalization” process and the stated connection between extremist thought and opinion and extremist violence and terrorism. Some of these conceptual confusions are highlighted in Chapter II of the Study titled: “Conceptual Confusions in an Ideological War”.
Chapter III of the study titled: “Character Arc of a Terrorist: Radical Thought to Violent Action”, explores the various theoretical models and frameworks, counter-radicalization experts have developed to explain the transition of an ordinary citizen into a radical and violent extremist or terrorist, and seeks to understand the motivations and circumstances that abet the transformation.
The differences between anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes around the world, and related measures initiated by countries around the world are covered in Chapter IV: “Reversing Radicalization: The Global Response”. This chapter also details some features of the Saudi PRAC and the UK’s ‘Prevent’ counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes, as well as India’s steady and deliberate progress in developing its own comprehensive counter-radicalization campaign.
Chapter V titled “Extremist Fiction and Development of Effective Counter-Narratives,” seeks to explore the commonalities in all extremist narratives and the contours for developing effective counter-narratives. The concluding Chapter: “Recommended Social and Institutional Changes in India,” offers some recommendations toward developing effective measures against the growing threat of radicalization in the country.

I.                    Conceptual Confusions in an Ideological War

“Terrorism is a psychological warfare. Terrorists try to manipulate us and change our behavior by creating fear, uncertainty and division in society.”[1]
-          Patrick J. Kennedy

a)       The Difficulty of Definition
Just like the term ‘terrorism’, there exists a great deal of confusion and debate over the proper meaning and definition of the term ‘radicalization’. In fact, this difficulty has led to a critical wariness among some experts as attempts at reaching an acceptable and comprehensive definition of the term has proven unsuccessful. For example, Belgian counter-terrorism expert Rik Coolsaet, part of an Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation established by the European Commission, has described the very notion of radicalisation as ‘ill-defined, complex and controversial.”[2] Again, an Australian team of analysts recently concluded that “about the only thing that radicalisation experts agree on is that radicalisation is a process. Beyond that there is considerable variation as to make existing research incomparable”.[3]

Still, various state intelligence and security services have come up with their own “working definitions” for the term and its related concepts. Thus, the Dutch Security Service (AIVD) defines radicalization as: “Growing readiness to pursue and/or support—if necessary by undemocratic means — far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order.”[4] Under its CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, the UK’s Home Office has referred to radicalization simply as: “The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups.”[5]

According to Wilner and Dubouloz, “Radicalization is a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behavior.”[6]

If the definition of ‘radicalization’ has been problematic, so has been the discussion on the distinction between ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’. Individuals who play a significant role in radicalization of others and indirectly participate in facilitating acts of terrorism, through their words and actions, come under the category of ‘violent extremists’ (VE).[7] Scholars also divide extremism into two categories. The so-called “benign” form of extremism concentrates more in propagating and promoting the concepts of its radical or totalitarian cause, whereas the malevolent form of seeks the “destruction of those (concepts and forces) that oppose it”.[8]

As for terrorism, the international community is yet to formulate an accepted comprehensive definition of the term. However, The United Nations General Assembly has used the following political description of terrorism since 1994: “Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”[9]


b)       Radicalization and Terror: Is there a Definite Connection?

In their response to the escalating threat of violent extremism and terrorism around the world, several governments have launched disparate CVE (countering violent extremism) programs to arrest the proliferation of radical and extremist ideologies in society by violent non-state actors. This process of an individual’s transformation from a moderate, law-abiding citizen into an active anti-state extremist is referred to as Radicalization into Violent Extremism (RVE),[10] or more commonly as “radicalization”.

Radicalization presupposes the principal role played by the agents of certain radical political and religious organizations in misguiding impressionable minds into joining their ranks and into committing crimes of violent extremism and terrorism, through a process of dubious proselytizing and indoctrination aimed at justifying such acts. However, several terrorism experts insist that the process of such ideological indoctrination and radicalization is not the sole and often not the main cause behind the transformation of a peace-abiding individual into a violent extremists or terrorist. Empirical evidence shows that terrorists often never receive formal indoctrination and do not undergo a process of radicalization before joining an extremist or terrorist organization. Many of them are usually drawn into radical organizations for a variety of other reasons, such as familial ties or criminal affiliations etc.[11] Conversely, opinion polls conducted over decades reveal that even when large sections of a population or a community may claim to be supportive of radical ideologies and extremist violence, they never actively support or participate in carrying out acts of terrorism.[12]

Olivier Roy, the noted French scholar of Islamic society, states that even jihadi terrorism “shares many factors with other forms of dissent, either political or behavioral. Most radicals have broken with their families; they don’t mention traditions of Islam or fatwas, but rather act on an individual basis and outside the usual bonds of family, mosque and Islamic association. Modern Islamic terrorism is an avatar of ultra-leftist radicalism—its targets are the same as the traditional targets of the ultra-left—US imperialism, symbols of globalization.”[13]

Again scholars like John Horgan note that “the relationship between radicalisation and terrorism is poorly understood … Not every radical becomes a terrorist and not every terrorist holds radical views”.[14]

Thus, extremist ideology and violent action are often but not always connected to each other and therefore an excessive focus of some countries on counter-radicalization programs as a means to confront the threat of terrorism is often questioned. Again, the plans of certain European countries to curb the activities of avowedly non-violent extremist organizations, which allegedly radicalize credulous minds, has also comes in for a lot of criticism and it is charged that certain religious and ideological groups are unjustifiably targeted. It is contended that terrorists are often radicalized by factors like sense of political alienation and disenfranchisement, perceived persecution and discrimination, socio-cultural and psychological factors rather than the extreme ideals of a radical ideology per se.[15]

c)       Do we need counter radicalization programmes?

In the wake of these issues, many experts have questioned the need for investing in counter-radicalization programmes. However, it is noteworthy that many countries faced the menace of radicalization after the 9/11 terror attacks and the Iraq war of 2003, where thousands of young radicals in various countries were arrested, convicted or imprisoned, often with little inculpatory evidence against them. The question then arose as to how to manage these radicalized individuals during their period of imprisonment and how to mitigate the potential threat they might pose to society after their release.[16]

It is in this context that several countries developed various anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs to encourage disengagement and deradicalization of these individuals from the path of violent extremism. Thus, many radicalized detainees were put under surveillance, monitoring and training courses. Programs include consular assignments, religious rehab, educational and vocational rehab, community and family rehab, recreational rehab as well as care and custody.

Over the years many radical extremists were rescued from joining the ranks of terrorist organizations and have been successfully rehabilitated as responsible citizens of society. It is pointed out that a marginal rate of recidivism does not invalidate the good work done in rescuing thousands of misguided individuals from joining the forces of terrorism.

d)       Is Radicalization the Right Word?

There is also a school of scholarship to which radicalization is not a negative term in itself as it believes the identification of an ideology or group as radical or moderate depends on the political context leading to its emergence. It is contended that most revolutionaries of modern political thought, even the proponents of individual freedom and human rights (like Thomas Jefferson and Nelson Mandela) were radical leaders espousing violence to achieve their revolutionary goals. Therefore, radicalism that opposes state oppression in and of itself is not a negative term and that all of human progress is the creation of the radical mind that opposes conventional beliefs or the established order.

Again, it is contended that the use of counter-terrorism  and counter-radicalization programs by some governments are not merely directed against violent extremism, but are a covert attempt at curtailing civil liberties and human rights in order to exert state control over various facets of individual thought, liberty and private enterprise.[17]

Meanwhile some experts like Arun Kundnani and Alex P. Schmid argue that the very concept of radicalization has gained currency because it is viewed as being directed against Islamic extremism and therefore it has “become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision.”[18] Some point out that the word “radicalization” came into its present use following the 7/7 terror attacks in July 2005 and that the practice of searching radicalized individuals in the UK and the US is leading to so-called “Muslim McCarthyism”.[19]

Thus, Arun Kundnani notes: “Following the neoconservative paradigm, models of radicalisation tend to assume that extremist religious ideology drives terrorism. In addition, as with the neoconservatives, they focus overwhelmingly on acts of violence carried out by Muslims and rarely address political violence and terrorism more generally … For some radicalisation analysts, the role of extremist religious ideology in this process is akin to a “conveyor belt” that mechanically pushes an individual into terrorism. This implies that, once someone has adopted the extremist ideology, terrorism is likely to follow sooner or later. For others, this process is more complex and depends not only on ideology but also on psychological factors, such as the experience of a recent traumatic event. Whatever nuances are added to the picture, the underlying assumption in radicalisation models is usually the same: that some form of religious ideology is a key element in turning a person into a terrorist. This analysis has underpinned counter-terrorism policy-making in the UK since 2006 and led to viewing certain forms of religious ideology as an early warning sign of potential terrorism.”[20]

Under the cloud of such conceptual and ideological dissonance within academic circles, governments around the world have struggled to develop cogent and effective counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization programs or effectively coordinate their activities in charting a coherent global campaign against the growing menace of violent extremism.

However, the fact remains that various terrorist organizations around the world are conducting highly violent campaigns aimed at destabilizing the global socio-political order in pursuance of their extreme and divisive ideologies, and in the process are weaning away many bright and impressionable minds to their devious ideological cause. Clearly, this menace needs to be confronted at religious, ideological and the socio-political level, which underscores the need for counter-radicalization measures by societies and states in unison.

e)       The Multiplicity of Causes and Catalysts

Since the late 1960s, academic research has grappled with the question of the causes and reasons behind a person adopting beliefs and behaviors that lead him or her to engage in subversive or terrorist activities.

Several studies have attempted an answer by analyzing terrorist activity at different levels: individual, group, network, organization, mass movement, socio-cultural context, and international/interstate contexts.[21]

For a long time, scholars concentrated on the reasons for a person’s transformation into a violent extremist at the psychological and individual level. However, its causes are now viewed not just at an individual level, but also at social and larger geo-political levels:[22]

Micro-level, i.e. the causes and catalysts leading to the radicalization of an individual at the psychological level pertain to identity problems, failed integration with society, feelings of alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, relative deprivation, humiliation (direct or by proxy), stigmatisation and rejection, often combined with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge. Closely attached to these problems are problems of confusion caused by inherent crisis of splintered identity and loyalty (patriotism vs. communal loyalty), the clash of values (liberal vs conservative, state philosophy vs. religious/ideological indoctrination), childhood abuse/disturbed adolescence, low self and low social esteem, alienation and de-individuation, rebel identity and counter culture, cognitive readjustment of self-sanction to violence, misanthropic and sociopathic tendencies etc.[23]

 Meso-level, This level refers to the radical milieu in the immediate social environment (“the supportive or even complicit social surround”) which fosters the radicalization of individuals, groups leading to the formation of terrorist organizations.[24] At this communal or societal level  there is a heightened sense of religious or racial ethnocentricity, xenophobia, perceptions of injustice and discrimination, heightened sense of desperation and disenfranchisement, low personal and social esteem, extreme historical memory and ideological indoctrination, sense of betrayal, breakdown of law and order, growing polarization of society, the decline of scientific temper, proliferation of rabid extremist thought and tendencies in society etc.

Macro-level, i.e. role of national politics and governance issues within a country or geopolitical events around the world in the radicalisation of public opinion. Such issues could include tense majority – minority relationships, the lack of socio-economic opportunities for certain class or community of people, national or international wars or conflicts involving religious or ideological issues, the growing influence of transnational terrorist radicalization and recruitment activities, proliferation of failed states and civil strife, etc.[25]
We can add to these the usual litany of so-called “root causes” behind terrorism, which would serve the process of radicalization just as well. Some of these “root causes” were enumerated by spokespersons from around 170 countries following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the UN General Assembly, and a sample is listed below:[26]

       Communities struck by poverty, disease, illiteracy, bitter hopelessness (Armenia);
       Social inequality, marginalization and exclusion (Benin);
        Political oppression, extreme poverty and the violation of basic rights (Costa Rica);
        Injustices, misery, starvation, drugs, exclusion, prejudices, despair for lack of perspectives (Dominican Republic);
       Oppression of peoples in several parts of the world, particularly in Palestine (Malaysia);
        Alienation of the young in situations of economic deprivation and political tension and uncertainty, sense of injustice and lack of hope (New Zealand);
       Rejection of the West with all its cultural dimensions (Palestine);
       Hunger, poverty, deprivation, fear, despair, absence of sense of belonging to the human family (Namibia);
       Situations which lead to misery, exclusion, reclusion, the injustices which lead to growing frustration, desperation and exasperation (Senegal).

For its part, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research identifies more than 50 different alleged ‘causes’. Some of the causes mentioned are the following:[27]

• Terrorism is rooted in political discontent;
• A culture of alienation and humiliation can act as a kind of growth medium in which the process of radicalisation commences and virulent extremism comes to thrive;
• A collective or individual desire for revenge against acts of repression may be motive enough for terrorist activity;
• The failure to mobilize popular support for a radical political program may trigger the decision to employ terrorism in order to engineer a violent confrontation with the authorities;
• Modern terrorism occurs because modern circumstances make terrorist methods exceptionally easy;
• The choice of terrorism represents the outcome of a learning process from own experiences and the experiences of others.
II.                  Character Arc of a Terrorist: Radical Thought to Violent Action

“Those who can make you believe in absurdities, can make you commit atrocities”[28]
-          Voltaire

Many Paths to the Dark Side

In spite of all this literature and after about 40 years of research into the study of terrorism, research into the process of ‘radicalization’ into violent extremist action is “conceptual rather than empirical” and remains “poorly understood”.[29] However, early assumptions that the “aberrant behavior” was the consequence of some mental or personality abnormality have been convincingly debunked. Although the exact mechanisms and processes of radicalization remain a matter of debate, it is clear that a different set of pathways and circumstances affect people in different stages of life in transitioning to the dark side. Thus radicalization is not viewed as “the product of a single decision but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to violence over time.”[30]

Again, the process of radicalization cannot be inextricably linked to recruitment in violently extreme or terrorist organizations. For example, Marc Sageman avers that there is no recruitment per se to militant jihad or to Al-Qaeda. He presents a study that shows that nearly 90% “join the jihad” through friendship and kinship.[31] However, it is also true that terrorist organizations engage in radicalization programs through propaganda not only to influence vulnerable minds toward accepting their points of view, but also to draw recruits. Terrorist groups, like the ISIS, brazenly urge Muslims around the world, through their online literature and social media websites, to migrate to territories under the group’s control and “join the jihad” as part of  a so-called religious obligation.

Academic Theories on The Radicalization Process
Over the years, scholars have propounded various theories to explain the process of transition changing a person from being an average citizen to a violent extremist that radicalization effects, but many contemporary researchers often question the conclusions of these theoretical frameworks in the contemporary context. Still, there are some noteworthy theoretical approaches, such as those derived from the social movement theory, social psychology, and conversion theory, which remain useful in exploring the processes and the drivers of radicalization.

i)                    The Social Movement Theory (SMT): The basic idea behind this theory, which was propounded in the 1940s, is that radical social movements rise from strained socio-political conditions, which fester in a mass sentiment of discontent. People join such movements as they passively succumb to overpowering social forces. In contemporary times, a new school of SMT has come up with the so-called Framing Theory.


ii)                  [32] According to it, the ideologues of any radical movement attempt to frame messages in ways that to them will best resonate with the interests, attitudes, and beliefs of their potential constituency.

According to its proponents, the Framing Theory is useful for understanding radicalization because it focuses on processes, not socio-demographics, and because it emphasizes a mid-level analysis. Applying this framework, an important study was recently conducted by Quintan Wiktorowicz which looked into the way people came to join extremist Islamist groups in Western countries.[33] By employing the SMT framework, Wiktorowicz presented a four-component development model for radicalization. The study found that many Westerners and educated people who become radicalized initially showed an openness to accepting new and differing worldviews (called “cognitive opening”). Soon they see in a religion or a particular socio-political ideology a life of significance and meaning and eventually accept a group’s narrative and ethos, which to them “makes sense” (termed as “frame alignment”). Eventually through a process of greater interaction with members of an extremist group, they become fully indoctrinated into the movement. In fact, this process is quite similar to the process of any individual’s conversion to any religion or socio-political group or organization.
  
iii)                Social Psychology: Many theories of social psychology shed remarkable insight into how individuals become radicalized once they get associated with an extremist or terrorist organization and commit acts which they could not have imagined committing on their own. According to them, the process of change into violent extremism starts after an individual joins an extremist organization. For over two decades, Bryn Mawr and Clark McCauley[34] have been one of the most consistent voices of social psychology in the field of terrorism studies. These scholars applied various tenets of social psychology to find out that “individual opinions and attitudes tend to become more extreme in a group context. Group opinions and attitudes also tend to be more extreme than those held by its individual members, a phenomenon often referred to as “group polarization.”

Again, individuals feel less responsible for “group” actions as they diffuse accountability over the entire group. Thus, there is a greater disregard for carrying out immoral and extremely violent actions. This “diffusion and displacement of responsibility” often leads to the so-called “de-individuation” of a horrible act by the perpetrator and the person often points to the dubious moral justification learnt from the group and worse by blaming the victim or by speaking of them in dehumanizing terms. In psychological terms, this tendency is known as “the cognitive readjustment of self-sanction”.[35]

In addition, radical and socially isolated groups tend to deepen “in-group/out-group bias” and exercise greater control on the behavior of members.[36] Often people join certain radical groups because of perceived rewards or gains, acceptance and recognition within a community, and not out of any strong ideological convictions towards the philosophy of the group.

Thus, the reasons for joining extremist groups are dynamic and variable for different individuals. Whereas for some social affiliation or personal sense of meaning and life purpose may be the reason, while others may find a sense of adventure and excitement appealing. Many young recruits may come from broken homes or a family having a criminal background. They may be taking revenge on larger society that did not accept them and so these people develop a rebel identity and develop a counter culture by joining the ranks of these groups.

(iii) Conversion Theory: Focusing on the psychology of the individual going through the radicalization process and given the fact that many contemporary extremist movements follow an avowedly religious ideology or cause, many theorists have studied the process of religious conversion itself (which can happen with people converting from outside the religion or from within the religious community itself to a more radically extreme version followed by a radical group).

On the basis of decades of study into developmental or stage models in the study of religious conversions, Lewis Rambo has developed a seven-component model which has been found among most extremist converts.[37]
Researchers have found several “conversion motifs” that lead a person to adopt a new religious ideology, with or without direct external influence.

These include “intellectual motif” (by reading books, through the Internet, television or other media), “mystical” (which relates to personally transformative epiphany or moment of supposed spiritual enlightenment), “experimental” (where a seeker connects with a group to find an identity of group membership), “affectional or romantic” (where conversion results either from strong emotional sentiment, attachment or bonding), “revivalist” (refers to a transformative experience occurring in the context of a crowd); and “coercive” ( where people capitulate to group pressure and influences into accepting a radical viewpoint).[38]


Profile of the Typical Radical

After several decades of intense study, terrorism experts have found no single definitive process or profile for identifying a prospective radical extremist or terrorist, in terms of his or her demographic or socio-economic background. In fact, Walter Lacquer states that the quest for a “general theory” is misguided because: “Many terrorisms exist and their character has changed over time and from country to country.”[39]

This is also applicable to the radicalization process itself. In spite of several attempts to articulate a general sequence of stages or issues that might apply across and within group types, there is no clear answer on how people come to adopt violent extremist ideologies to justify their use of terrorist violence.

In recent times, researchers like John Venhaus, have conducted an in-depth study of the life and motivations of Al-Qaeda fighters. Based on interviews and personal histories of 2,032 “foreign fighters” who sought to affiliate with jihadi groups, Venhaus found that “they all were looking for something … they wanted to know who they are, why they matter, and what their role in the world should be. They have an unfulfilled need to define themselves which Al-Qaeda offers to fill.”[40] Thus, he categorized most radicalized jihadi recruits into four categories:

a)       The Revenge Seeker: Highly frustrated and angry militant, seeking to commit violence against certain people, group or entity, whom he or she believes are at fault.
b)       The Status Seeker: A social misfit seeking recognition and esteem by joining a militant organization.
c)       The Identity Seeker: Driven by a need to belong or be part of something meaningful, which would define the person’s identity.
d)       The Thrill Seeker: The thrill and adventure seekers were found to be less than 5 percent of the lot, whose main motivation in joining a terrorist group is to pursue, excitement, adventure and glory.

It would be wrong to rigidly compartmentalize the types as there is often a great deal of overlap across all these categories. For their part, MacCauley and Masolenko[41] have classified individual mechanisms of radicalization in the following ways: individual radicalization through personal grievance, through political grievance, gradual process of radicalization through association with terrorist group (the slippery slope), radicalization through love or emotional bond with radicals, radicalization caused by a destabilizing life event (a real or perceived injustice or being a victim of violence or oppression), radicalization to seek life purpose, adventure or status among outlaws.
III.               Reversing Radicalization: The Global Response

“The best way to fight terrorism is not through guns. It’s through pens, books, teachers and schools”[42]
-          Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala Yousufzai

a)       Anti-Radicalization, Counter-Radicalization and Deradicalization Measures

Surprisingly, conceptual confusion regarding the definition of ‘radicalization’ extends to the understanding of measures developed to counter the process of radicalization.
After several years of deliberations, strategists seem to have largely agreed upon the differing connotations for these terms.[43] We are told that the issue here is not a matter of syntactical nuance, as each term refers to a separate and specific set of measures employed to reverse the process of radicalization in different stages of its lactic cycle with characteristic behavior, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

Thus, anti-radicalization programs are launched to protect segments of population that have only recently come under the influence of radicalization and cover measures related to detection and developing deterrence.

Counter-radicalization campaigns aim to target those radicalized elements that may have not yet joined forces of violent extremism or terrorism and could be rescued before they attempt the dangerous transition. The measures suited to counter-terrorism operations include disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration programs.

The third category pertains to de-radicalization programs, which are devised for those individuals who may have already aided, abetted or committed acts of violent extremism.[44] Thus these measures cover post-surrender and post-detention programs.

Many of these behavior modification programmes include ideological or religious counseling, vocational education, recreational and psychological rehab, inter-religious or inter-communal discourse programs, post-release surveillance and care, as well as involvement of family members and civil society to foster rehabilitation etc.

b)       Global Response to Radicalization

Many countries faced the menace of radicalization for the first time after the 9/11 terror attacks and the Iraq war of 2003, when thousands of young radicals in various countries were arrested, convicted or imprisoned, often with little inculpatory evidence against them. The question then arose on how to manage these radicalized individuals during their period of imprisonment and how to mitigate the potential threat they might pose to society after their release.[45]  It is in this context that several countries developed various anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs to encourage disengagement of these radicals from the path of violent extremism. Thus, many radicalized detainees were put on ongoing surveillance, monitoring and training courses.

About 40 countries in the world are currently running various indigenously developed anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes and campaigns. These can be broadly categorized into ten key categories.[46]

         i.            Engaging and working with civil society: As a government may not always have the resources to counter radicalization and to stop violent extremism from spreading, civil societies and local communities can bring to bear a range of tools and informally reach out to a wider population. In fact, working with communities and civil society enhances trust and transparency and strengthens social cohesion. Therefore, several countries have developed programmes to engage local communities in efforts to counter radicalization processes. One such programme is Norway’s Exit Project (established in 1997), which seeks to support young people who want to disengage with or leave radical racist or other violent extremist groups (e.g. neo-Nazi groups).[47] Meanwhile, the Russian government has set up consultative organizations for enhancing cooperation with civil society groups in order to promote inter-ethnic relations, prevention of extremism, xenophobia and ethnic conflicts at regional and local levels. For its part, Singapore is fostering engagement with religious minorities to discredit and debunk the false propaganda by extremist organizations.[48]

        ii.            Prison Programmes: The incarceration of violent extremists and terrorists in prisons has led to serious issues for various countries. Highly radicalized extremists have found ways of turning prisons into their own training camps. This has raised the issue of whether it is better to separate such extremists from other inmates or to allow them to mix freely with others.  “Allowing violent extremists to mix freely has carried serious costs in allowing them to seek out and successfully recruit fellow prisoners; but evidence also shows that segregating extremists in separate blocks has allowed them to maintain an organizational hierarchy and hone their operational skills.”[49]

Saudi Arabia has gone to the extent of establishing new and special prisons for violent extremists, which not only separates them from regular detainees but also separates them from each other in individual cells. Several other countries have developed similar facilities that aim to prevent prisons from becoming breeding grounds for terrorism and a poll for recruitment. It is to be noted that most of the top leadership of the ISIS, including Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, were incarcerated in Camp Bucca in Iraq, which had veritably turned into a training camp for the nascent terror organization in its early days.[50] In addition, various prisons have been running several deradicalization programs, such as in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, which provide psychological counseling, religious counseling and correct religious teaching, vocational training and other prison programmes that could help prisoners disengage themselves from radical groups and join public life as law-abiding citizens once they leave prisons.

      iii.            Education Programmes: Education features prominently in counter-radicalisation programmes developed by various countries, given the important role of schools and educational establishments in promoting  the values of nonviolence, peaceful coexistence and tolerance. In multi-cultural United Kingdom, for example, authorities work closely with providers of education at all levels. This has resulted in the teaching in schools of subjects that promote intercultural understanding and citizenship. Through schemes like “Children’s Plan”, state officials engage directly with head-teachers in order to ensure their access to all forms of support needed, as well as ensuring support for young, vulnerable people who may be exposed to violent extremist influences.[51]

In Austria, school curricula and religious education classes instruct against intolerance as part of civic education.[52] Meanwhile, Belgian educational authorities have designed educational programmes to inform pupils and parents about the dangers pertaining to violent extremism and terrorism, and have also developed special educational programmes to combat violent extremist beliefs and promote tolerance and coexistence.

      iv.            Promoting alliance of civilizations and intercultural dialogue: Several alliances and initiatives that promote intercultural dialogue and understanding to counter radicalisation have been launched by various countries around the world. For instance, New Zealand’s efforts to counter violent extremism has led it to co-sponsor “Asia-Pacific Interfaith Dialogue” that brings together 15 representatives of the major faith and community groups in the Southeast Asian and South Pacific regions. Similarly, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with Islamic charities launched the “Montreux Initiative” in 2005[53] to help counter extreme ideologies. In Thailand, moderate Muslim organizations from abroad are being invited to exchange views and ideas with local religious leaders in order to enrich an understanding of Islam and promote true religious teaching. Thailand has also played a significant role in supporting Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation (Indonesia, 2004), the AsiaMiddle East Dialogue (AMED), the AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM) Interfaith Dialogue,[54] and it has cosponsored the Informal Meeting of Leaders on Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation for Peace during the 60 th Session of the UNGA. Italy’s Ministry for Youth and Sport, jointly with the Ministry of Interior, set up a Youth Advisory Board in 2006 for religious and cultural dialogue.

       v.            Tackling Economic And Social Inequalities: Although empirical research does not show any direct link between economic and social inequalities and the incidence of terrorism or violent extremism, with terrorists and extremists coming from all economic backgrounds, several countries have undertaken policies to tackle social and economic discrimination against minority communities. For example, the Netherlands has introduced several schemes for youths belonging to certain sections of society, susceptible to the influence of radicalization, to have fair prospects of employment in the labor market. The government also provides language training to communities of foreign origin and is facilitating the schooling and education of the young belonging to these poor communities.[55] Algeria provides direct financial and welfare support to victims of violent extremism, whereas Saudi Arabia and Malaysia provide tuition fees, medical treatment, and financial support for food and clothing. Malaysia even looks after the families of the detainees.[56] This helps in deterring other members of a radical’s family from joining the ranks of extremist groups.

      vi.            Countering Radicalization on the Internet: Terrorist organizations have successfully taken advantage of the great benefits of the Internet – low cost, ease of access, lack of censorship or regulations in most countries, vast audience and fast communication and flow of information – in order to disseminate their message of hate and gain more recruits.[57]

Many governments have sought to intervene in this matter through censorship, monitoring and counter-propaganda programmes. The United Kingdom Government is now supporting mainstream voices to articulate a moderate understanding of various religions in the country. One example is the government’s active support and encouragement for the “Radical Middle Way” project,[58] where young Muslims can access a wide range of views and opinions from all the major Muslim schools of thought. Meanwhile, Nigeria conducts forums and conferences on combating terrorism through the Internet. The Singapore government encourages moderate religious scholars and teachers to launch websites which carry arguments that rebut violent extremist teachings and beliefs.[59]

    vii.            Legislation Reforms: Several countries have introduced legislation that prohibit the dissemination of extremist literature, the delivery of hate speeches, incitement to racism, xenophobia and violence. Canada is one of the earliest countries to have enacted a law criminalizing incitement to extremist violence (1985) and hate crimes.[60] France has also enacted laws against groups that promote discrimination, hatred and violence towards a person or a group of people based on their ethnic origin or religious, racial or ideological affiliation.[61] Algeria has used its legislation to create a national consensus and reconciliation programme. Thus, the President is able to pardon and/or reduce the sentences of individuals who have been convicted of committing violent extremist acts if they have not committed mass murder, rape or were involved in causing explosions in public places.

   viii.            Rehabilitation Programmes: Several countries around the world have initiated rehabilitation programmes that deradicalize detainees charged with crimes of violent extremism in order to reintegrate them into society once their prison term ends. For example, Saudi Arabia has designed a special programme − Al-Ria’ya (translated as “care”), which transfers detained extremists to specially designed facilities.

This programme provides psychological counseling, correct religious education that teaches tolerance and moderation. Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have their own set of religious counseling programmes and other deradicalization measures.

      ix.            Developing and Disseminating Information: Several countries have developed close cooperation with each other in conducting counter-radicalization programs, and some states in Europe have developed integrated information systems on those involved in making hate speeches and incitement to terrorism, both inside and outside the European Union.  Most notably, The Italian Central Directorate of Prevention Police has recently launched a project with the European Group of Six 42 relating to the sharing and analysis of information on the movement of so-called “itinerant preachers”. [62]

       x.            Training of Agencies Involved In Counter-Radicalisation Policies: Some countries have introduced training and qualification programmes for their officials and community workers involved in counter-radicalization programmes. The US, Canada and Belgium conduct special training programmes to their police and law enforcement agencies in matters related to special aspects of their community’s religious and cultural sensibilities and the way investigations against extremism should be conducted by taking members of a religious community into confidence.

In 2003, Norwegian Police Security Service set out police personnel to identify activities related to the radicalization of youth by right-wing extremists and to carry out “preventive conversations” with youth from falling prey to violent extremism.[63]

c)       Two Case Studies: The Saudi and British Counter-Radicalization Programmes

i)        Saudi Prevention, Rehabilitation And Post-Release Care (PRAC) Programme

In the aftermath of a wave of terrorist attacks beginning in 2003, Saudi Arabia launched its own indigenously developed form of counter-radicalization campaign. The Saudi approach has been to combat intellectual and ideological justifications provided by violently extreme jihadist organizations for carrying out terrorist attacks. The Saudi strategy consists of three interconnected programmes aimed at Prevention, Rehabilitation And Post-Release Care (PRAC).[64]

Although the jury is out over the success of the Saudi counter-radicalization programmes, they are said to have inspired similar campaigns in other countries facing the threat, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia approaches counter-radicalization as a “war of ideas predicated on issues of legitimacy, authority and religious permissibility”.[65] The government regards extremists as victims of an “evil ideology”, and considers many extremists as well-intentioned men who wanted to do good deeds. By focusing on a correct understanding of religion, the state aspires to help “misguided believers” return to the right path.

The Saudi approach emphasizes the defeat of the ideological infrastructure that supports political violence and the Saudi campaign is directed against ‘takfiri’ (declaring people apostates) beliefs, rehabilitation of reclaimed offenders and post-release “care” to prevent relapses. “It takes on these challenges through time-tested Saudi policies such as co-optation, patronage and coercion.”

As part of the “prevention” component of the strategy, hundreds of government-run programs, implemented through the “guidance department” in the Ministry of Interior, are aimed at educating the public about Islamic extremism and its dangers to society.[66]

In schools, universities and mass media, recognized religious scholars and authorities disseminate the right religious understanding to confront extremist propaganda. “The primary audience is not extremists themselves, but the larger population that may sympathize with extremists and those who do not condemn the beliefs that lead to extremism.”

When it comes to deradicalization of extremists, the government heavily relies on the importance of religious dialogue to address a detainee’s misconceptions about Islam. However in recent years, new emphasis is laid on modifying a detainee’s behavior and not just a change in his or her religious beliefs. Thus, the programmes have diversified and cover classes and counseling on sharia law, psychology, vocational training, sociology, history, Islamic culture, art therapy, and athletics. Many of these centers have updated classes on history and culture to counter the growing influence of an alternative view of history and culture presented by Al-Qaeda. As mentioned above the government has built special facilities (see above Al-Ria’ya programme) for the incarceration and deradicalization of extremists, separate from ordinary criminals detained in state prisons.

As part of its post-release programmes, the government has expanded the role of a detainee’s family. “In addition to visiting during the program and providing post-release support, family members now provide input on how to design specialized programs for each detainee and inform how his progress is evaluated. Center staff also use sequenced trial releases with the families to observe how each party responds to the other, assess the individual undergoing rehabilitation, and determine whether family members will be capable of supervising him after release. This last element is critical to ensure the family can help prevent a formerly violent extremist from becoming a threat again.”[67]

Thus, the PRAC strengthens social bonds during the rehabilitative process by including a detainee’s family and offering social services to him and his family.  It promotes a bond between detainee and a state-sponsored cleric to establish a new ideological framework through authority and trust. Then again, in order address the social needs of a detainee, the Saudi Government provides financial assistance in the form of lost salary, family healthcare, and children’s schooling during the detainee’s incarceration. 

After impressive success initially, Saudi authorities accept recent setbacks in the face of a rise in the recidivism rate among “deradicalized extremists” by as much as 10% to 20%. In January 2009, authorities made the embarrassing announcement that at least eleven former Guantanamo detainees returned to terrorist activity after graduating from the Saudi program.[68] Still, Saudi Arabia has developed a counter-radicalization programme that has its admirers around the world and the government continues to refine the process based on experience and fresh insights. One of its salient aspects is that the program is not punitive in nature but is rather rehabilitative for the “victims” of radicalization.

ii)                  UK’s Preventing Violent Extremism (Prevent) Strategy

The 5-million-pound counter-radicalization ‘Prevent’ strategy constitutes one of the four Ps that make up the British government’s post 9/11 counter-terrorism strategy,[69] known as ‘CONTEST’: ‘Prepare’ for attacks, ‘Protect’ the public, ‘Pursue’ the attackers and ‘Prevent’ their radicalisation in the first place. The policy was not very popular to begin with, but has become even more controversial after the current government under Prime Minister David Cameron revised it, with a new and more controversial approach.

In 2011, the British government introduced the new version as an alternative to the supposed failure of the previous policy that according to the new Home Secretary Theresa May was unable to separate a policy of integration from that of counterterrorism. In its critique to the earlier policy, the then newly elected Tory government averred that greater integration in itself was not sufficient for countering radicalization, but a successful strategy was needed to confront the ideologies behind extremism and terrorism head on. Thus, ‘Prevent’ defines extremism as a “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance for different faiths and beliefs.”[70]

However, this values-based definition of ideology has been controversial and its critics claim it to be reflective of the political discourse of right-leaning European political parties that reject the concept of multiculturalism and see it as a failure. For example, Prime Minister David Cameron is being criticized by some leaders of the British Muslim community for arguing that Britons should confront multiculturalism with “muscular liberalism.”[71] Thus under ‘Prevent’, the main shift in the government’s strategy against radicalization has been that it is targeting violent ideologies by asserting its own ideology and by not confronting violent religious or ideological organizations within the framework of their own avowed religious or ideological paradigms.

Therefore, it is similar to the Saudi PRAC in that it has taken an ideological “war of ideas” approach to spearhead the counter-radicalization campaign, but is different from it in that it does not seek to reclaim extremists by advocating the true or moderate teachings of their religion or ideology, but by insisting that the radicalized do not revert to their essential religious values but to British values of democracy and human rights.

However since 2011, ‘Prevent’ has seen conspicuous success in its counter-radicalization campaigns. Its team for removing online extremist content has scrapped over 75,000 pieces of “unlawful terrorist material” from the Internet.[72]

The government claims it has worked with more than 250 mosques and 50 religious groups, has distributed over 20,000 leaflets and posters in various languages, which urge people against travelling to Syria. Through its deradicalization programme called ‘Channel’, the government uses psychologists, social activists and religious experts to advise thousands of people considered susceptible to extremist ideas.[73]

However, Prevent has been the most controversial ‘P’ of the other four in the CONTEST programme and has become highly unpopular even among most members of the British Muslim community. Its detractors criticize it for its inability to define “radicalization”, for singling out the Muslim community in Britain at the expense of British far-right White supremacist groups, for turning the former into a “suspect” community, for its assertion that “radicalization” is the main driver of violent extremism and terrorism, for monitoring and ‘spying’ over the population and “arbitrarily” referring people to deradicalization programmes, etc.

Some critics point out that the 50 million pound annual budget allocated for the programme has not been very useful and may have further polarized British population and pushed law-enforcement into the “pre-criminal” space. Others find Orwellian underpinnings that could pose a threat to the values of democracy and civil rights in the country.

d)       India’s Efforts at Developing Appropriate Counter-Radicalization Measures

Although India has confronted insurgencies and terrorist campaigns by various radicalized regional and religious organizations in several parts of the country for decades, a comprehensive policy for combating such problems at the ideological and operational level has not been developed, possibly as the causes of such threats have largely been socio-political in nature, and not driven by purely religious or ideological motivations. With the rise of militant Islamism, which seeks to project its own version of Islam as a revolutionary socio-economic and political antithesis to the modern geopolitical global world, the threat of radicalization has gained utmost importance.

In this respect, India is “working out a cohesive strategy to counter attempts at radicalization and recruitment,” suitable in the Indian context.[74] Various measures like counselling of “vulnerable and radicalized” youths as well as their families and propagating “moderate” interpretations of Islam to counter the IS ideology of violent extremism are being developed. Various measures like an “extremist counseling hotline”, set up recently by Austria, has reportedly drawn the interest of Indian authorities.[75] The viability of the US’ counter-radicalization programmes focused on community outreach and UK’s Prevent and Channel programmes in the Indian context is being considered. It seems Indian authorities have been wary of introducing highly intrusive and controversial forms of surveillance and de-radicalization measures, as they have recently proven quite controversial in countries like the UK.

At present, if the law enforcement agencies in India find an individual to be a highly radicalized person, they determine whether the person can be referred for de-radicalization. The person receives counseling either by the police or scholars of the ideological or religious affiliation to which the individual belongs. The person’s activities are monitored to prevent recidivism. These measures are currently in place in the states of Maharashtra and Telangana.[76]

Currently, the center and state governments in India are building their own set of counselors and religious experts, community leaders and elders, as well as civil society members to be engaged in the de-radicalization process. Community outreach programmes by security agencies reaching out to schools and colleges, as well as the setting up of help-lines are being developed.[77]
I.                    Extremist Fiction and Developing Effective Counter-Narratives

“Insanity in individuals is something rare - but in groups, parties, nations and epochs, it is the rule.”[78]
-          Friedrich Nietzsche
-           
a)       The Evolution of Extremist Ideologies

The subject of radicalization cannot be discussed in the absence of identifying some of the radical ideologies that are fuelling the problem of violent extremism and terrorism in the world. In fact, the US administration under President George W. Bush had itself renamed the so-called “war on terror” with the slogan “a global struggle against violent extremism”[79].

Most extremist and terrorist organizations of today are the offshoots of certain political and or religious revivalist/reactionary movements that came into existence in recent centuries, mostly deemed deviant by the traditional schools of their faith or political schools of origin.[80] Thus, the global campaign against extremism and terrorism is to be understood as essentially a war against certain radicalized and politically motivated socio-political or crypto-religious movements and is not directed against any community or religion.

Much like the rise of anarchism, fascism and communism of the 19th-20th centuries, the biggest threat to global peace and security in the early 21st century has come from extreme religio-political movements (particularly global jihadism).[81] After stripping religions of much of their spiritual trappings and mythological baggage, these crypto-religious movements have sought to remodel their faiths along the lines of modern political mass movements, and seek to establish theocracies based on their religious laws and precepts as an alternative to the mainly liberal, secular and democratic order of the international community.

Prominent among these extreme religious movements has the Islamism-inspired jihadist-Salafi movement  (which began in the late 18th and 19th centuries with its violent opposition to all schools of Islamic Shariah, both Sunni and Shiite[82]) and the Shiite theocratic model based on Khomeini’s expansion of the concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih[83].

b)       The Extremist Narrative
In order to justify their mixing of religion with politics and militarism, many of these extremist movements have concocted devious religio-political narratives, which need to be carefully studied and analyzed in order to then develop effective counter-narratives against them.

According to British Prime Minister David Cameron, the “root cause” of terrorism is the extremist narrative and not foreign policy or poverty.[84] In this context, let us understand the nature and role of an extremist narrative. Extremist narratives do not encompass the core philosophy of a radical ideology, whose minutiae remain vague to most of its followers. It is also not a fully codified canon assembled in one place, but is diffuse and woven around supposedly “inviolable” values, associated concepts and even smaller rationally constructed arguments. More important, it highlights the “evils” and the “shortcomings” of the rival communities or established order. Thus, a radical narrative refers to a series of justifications and arguments in defence of the supposed principles and values of an extremist ideology, and accusations against the prevailing order which necessitates its violent destruction.

Often, radical extremists begin by exposing a real or perceived flaw in the prevailing socio-political order, one that has a high possibility of resonating with the targeted section of a population. The purpose is to create a cognitive dissonance, particularly among the young, impressionable and vulnerable members of that community. Thereafter, other radical ideas are gradually introduced and slowly the full extremist dose is administered into the bloodstream of a neophyte recruit. It is this cleverly constructed emotional and rational exposition of dubious values and concepts that form an extremist narrative, which eventually radicalizes a credulous person into a full-blown extremist.

Narratives are of various kinds. Almost all radical ideologies follow the same set of narratives, and at times they can be easily interchanged by just removing the idiomatic expressions and phraseology belonging to one with the other. Some of these narrative strands are as follows:

i)                     The Persecution Complex: To begin with, almost all extremist narratives are very high on emotional content and rather short on intellectual merit or historical accuracy. They overdramatize any real or perceived insult or injury to the community’s religious and cultural identity, values and heritage at the hands of a foreign aggressor and evil collaborators from within the community.[85] There is always a feeling of grand conspiracy against the community that demands the need for decisive action from the silent and insensate majority. Incontrovertibly, decisive action becomes a euphemism for acts of violence. This so-called conspiracy is often contextualized in historic, if not primordial terms and an entire alternate historical narrative is developed in stark black and white paradigms.

ii)       Nostalgia for an Imagined Past: Most extremist narratives hearken back to an age of pristine purity when the supposedly persecuted religious community was at a presumed apogee of its spiritual and material achievements because of its proximity to the divine and its complete adherence to a sacred ethical code, in sharp contrast to the morally degenerate members of the day. To the Muslim extremists, for example, this was the time of the ‘Salaf’ (the first three generations of Islam) from which Salafism derives its name. This nostalgia forces many of these organizations to try to reverse the course of history in order to take it back to ancient and medieval times.

iii)      The Call to Action and Bogey of Martyrdom: All extremist and terrorist organizations call members of their community to action against an existential threat to their community. They demand unquestioning loyalty to the leadership and a commitment to offer the supreme sacrifice for which they would be more than adequately compensated in the afterlife. In fact, ‘matyrdom’ is championed as the peak of a person’s spiritual ascension, a consummation devoutly to be wished. It is for this reason most violently extreme religious groups and terrorist organizations turn into death cults, even doomsday cults.[86]

iv)     Demonizing ‘The Other’: To all extremist organizations truth is spelt with a capital T. They then separate the presumed untruth practiced by other communities by demonizing them as the ‘Other’ and by painting them with a broad black brush.[87]

In waging a campaign against a so-called ‘enemy community’, they cannot afford to project the rival culture or people in 50 shades of grey as that would jeopardize their campaign against it.

v)                   The Supremacist and Panacea Construct: Most extremist narratives envy the scientific growth and progress of the modern world and claim that their communities were the progenitors of science and civilization. The modern world is said to have somehow stolen their pristine knowledge and technological prowess and has created a world of immorality, corruption and outright decadence. Therefore, it is either the Aryan race, the Jewish intellect, or the Muslim faith which is projected as an invincible force which will ultimately prevail. Again, most extremists aver that they have answers to all the ills facing modern civilization.

vi)                 The Armageddon and the Blissful Afterlife: Many extremist groups depend on some dubious religious literature and reinterpret it to claim their own prominence in shaping their community’s future. Some of them, such as the ISIS, imagine taking part in a prophesized end-of-the-world Armageddon by fancifully interpreting some Hadeeth literature. Again, the ultimate goal of all extremist movements is to achieve the blissful land of their dreams. For the radical Jews it is Zion of the Mashiach, for Evangelical Christians the 1000 year Millennial Kingdom of Jesus, for fundamentalist Muslims it is the Caliphate of Imam Mahdi and Eisa Maseeh and even for the Communist it is the Utopia of a stateless society. These wonderful predictions of the future are meant to seduce the credulous into fighting for the community with overzealous optimism.

It is easy to develop convincing counter-narratives against most of these extremist ideological strands as they are usually based on weak or false religious traditions and ideological sources.

c)       How to Develop Effective Counter-Narratives

In order to develop effective counter narratives, what is known as a “strategic rhetoric”, three components could prove very useful, as enunciated by Aristotle in his great philosophical treatise the ‘Rhetoric’.[88]

First is the Ethos, which means the credibility of the actors or channels of communication delivering the message. For example, a government servant asking a radical to change his ways may not be as effective a communicator as that of a reclaimed terrorist or a religious scholar.

The second component in any counter-narrative is the Logos, which means the message itself, its authenticity and how effective or rationally coherent it is in its claims.[89]

The third aspect is Pathos, which refers to the deep emotional resonance and cultural connect in the language and cadence of the message in order to influence the target audience. These days, subtle ways of subliminal messaging has been developed into an artform, which extremist groups like the ISIS, employ to great effect. Perhaps, it is time that anti-extremist counter-narratives also employ the art.

Clearly, any counter narrative or PR exercise needs to develop a variety of carefully formulated counter-narratives, developed by several experts on the subject, and needs to be disseminated through different agencies of transmission suitable for delivering the message to clearly designated sections of the target audience.

For example, if we wish to spread the message against extremist organizations in the country, we would have to at least target the five usual channels of recruitment.

a)   Places of worship and seminaries
b)   Centers of Extremist organizations
c)   Community-dominated areas and forums
d)   Prisons
e)   Cyberspace

Here let us also look into the various agencies that could be involved in delivering counter-radicalization messages. These might include:
       Govt Agencies
       NGOs
       Media Outlets, Both Print and Electronic
       Private Sector Organizations (particularly, Public Relations and Advertising companies)
       Internet and Social Media Campaigners
       Victims of Terrorism
       Reformed Extremists or Reclaimed Offenders
       Religious Leaders of Eminence (Both in India and Abroad)
       Religious Organizations
       Anti-Radical Propaganda Experts at Schools, Seminaries, Jails, Public Institutions, etc.
       Local community leaders for monitoring and informing government of any radical elements operating in the neighborhood.

d)       Types of Counter Narratives

Now we come to the important types of counter-narratives that can be developed as effective tools of counter radicalization.[90]

i)                     Positive Narrative: Before developing counter-narratives to fight extremism we need to first strengthen and reinvigorate the national narrative by propagating our core constitutional values, of democracy, pluralism and secularism. We need to develop a national vision so that every citizen knows how he/she would benefit from and contribute to the country’s goals so that they feel they have a stake in it.

ii)                   Amplify Doctrinal and Ideological Fissures: Some of the extremist narratives highlighted above reject orthodox schools of classical religion. Therefore, their claims of religious legitimacy can be easily discredited by highlighting their doctrinal deviance.

iii)                  The Semantics-Savvy Counter-Narrative: It is important that we do not use the words and terminologies of the extremists in our literature, let alone counter-narratives. For example, we better not use the word ‘Jihadis’ for Muslim terrorists. On hearing this, the uneducated and impressionable Muslim believes that the so-called ‘Jihadis’ are fighting a legitimate, religious war. Meanwhile, non-Muslims tend to get the idea that terrorism and Jihad are synonymous and start hating Islam and Muslims. Instead of calling Muslim terrorists as Jihadis, Mahmood Madani, the leader of Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind calls them ‘Fasadis’ (seditionists). Similarly, Sheikh Tahirul Qadri calls all Muslim terrorists as the followers of the ‘Khawarij’, an outcast sect thrown out of the fold of Islam after its members had assassinated Caliph Ali. By dissociating the name Jihadi from the description of the Muslim terrorist, we would discredit their campaign which is principally anti-Islamic. Therefore, the use of semantics is very important in any counter-radicalization campaign.[91]

iv)                 Strategic Counter Narratives: In times of extreme stress following a terror attack or communal violence, carefully prepared messages need to be delivered to stop large sections of the population and its communities from becoming polarized and radicalized by the incident.

v)                   Ethical Counter-Narratives: We need to disseminate the message that all religions are opposed to terrorism and that the Pope, the Great Sankaracharyas and Imam of the Holy Kaaba have condemned the actions of all religious extremist and terrorist organizations.

vi)                 Specialized Religious or Ideological Counter Narratives: On specialized and controversial legal or history-related issues, top experts need to devise specific counter-narratives to be disseminated through various agencies. Some extremists speak against global economic and political systems and criticize it on scholastic grounds. Such narratives must be refuted by experts in the subject.

vii)                Tactical Counter Narratives: Sometimes material that may discredit the leadership or members of extremist organization should be used to make such groups unpopular.

viii)              The Humor and Sarcasm Narrative: At times the use of humor and sarcasm to make fun of extremist leaders, their mannerisms and their speeches could prove an effective way of bring down their popularity.

ix)                 Subliminal Messaging: Advertising agencies and filmmakers are experts in communicating subliminal messages to their audience. Their expertise should be used in disseminating counter-narratives.[92]

II.                  Recommended Social and Institutional Changes in India

“The roots of violence: Wealth without work, pleasure without conscience, knowledge without character, commerce without morality, science without humanity, religion without sacrifice and politics without principle.”[93]

-          Mahatma Gandhi

Based on the above study, this paper recommends the following contours for an effective and comprehensive counter-radicalization programme for Indian administrative authorities.
a)       The role of civil society could prove crucial in fighting the growing threat of radicalization in India. The wider reach and informal approach of its programmes could prove more effective and garner greater trust among vulnerable communities than government sponsored programmes could. Civil society’s role in countering radicalization can foster a sense of belonging and shared identity and reduce real and perceived isolation among members of vulnerable communities and bridge internal community divisions. Thus, its role is vital in law enforcement, citizenship teaching, inter-faith dialogue, cohesion activities, language tuition, anti-discrimination projects, myth busting, housing and integration policies, improving educational attainment, mentoring and developing role models.[94]
b)       There is a need to empower the moderate voice among all communities in order to separate radicals from the general population through effective homegrown community outreach programs. An even-handedness in taking strict action against extremist organizations of all denominations is the need of the hour, even if they do not overtly engage in violent activities. Such organizations often function as fronts or breeding grounds for raising radical cadres.

c)       Again, the singling out of any community for counter-radicalization or de-radicalization referrals would only prove counterproductive as it would lead to greater divisiveness and radicalization, something the programmes are supposed to confront in the first place. Extremism often feeds itself off on both sides of the spectrum and gradually squeezes out the moderate voice in an escalating standoff. Therefore, counter-radicalization strategies should encompass all vulnerable communities in the country, unlike some aforementioned programmes in the West that have become highly controversial.

d)       There is also the need to track down the channels for the funding of certain religious organizations that may be spreading the poison of radicalization and the use of other forms of legal measures to curtail their actions aimed at fomenting communal discord or facilitating acts of violent extremism and terrorism.

e)       At the administrative level, there is a need to check growing politicization of religion across the political spectrum by stringent implementation of existing laws and strict compliance of the code of conduct during elections.

f)        Instances of communal violence should not be taken lightly or dismissed as incidents typical to a united, but dysfunctional family. India already has a highly radicalized population divided along communal and casteist lines. Serious thought must be given to preventing violent outbreaks, in times when foreign non-state actors are increasing their seditious activities in the country.

g)       Public perception across various communities regarding fairness and impartiality of security agencies and the judicial system in times of communal violence needs to improve. When members of any community start losing faith in the country’s law enforcement agencies it becomes more radicalized and some of its members start attacking state institutions itself and join foreign extremist groups.

h)       In addressing the problems faced by the minority communities, one cannot neglect the legitimate concerns and problems faced by the so-called majority community. Political parties should thus be wary of giving precedence to national interest before indulging in so-called minority appeasement or majoritarian populism.

i)         Anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs should be developed based on the country’s socio-cultural conditions and requirements. In this respect, more specialized wings in think tanks and relevant government departments have to be developed and competent personnel and facilities have to be groomed for implementing in our prisons, religious seminaries, schools, colleges etc., as far as possible.

j)        There is a need to introduce Religious Studies as a secular academic discipline in our universities, so that the false religious indoctrination of foreign extremist groups through the Internet could be countered and authorities may not have to depend on biased, opinionated and quack religious scholars to frame the country’s counter-narratives and de-radicalization policies.

k)       The importance of developing a strong counter-radicalization presence in the cyber world cannot be understated, particularly in the country’s regional languages in which the ISIS and Al-Qaeda are gradually spreading their message.

l)         Smart, non-controversial policies to reverse the process of communal segregation in our cities and towns are in order. Again, community elders and leaders need to be involved for purposes of monitoring, surveillance and guidance of the young and impressionable members from falling into the trap of extremism.

m)     There is a need to incorporate the subject of ethics in our school syllabi, which could teach universal values, such as respect for people of different religions or ways of life, the respect for women in society, the avoidance of indecent language and conduct (which is now becoming all too common in our social and political discourse), the importance of honesty against the evil of corruption, and obviously the dangers and horrors of violence and destruction, etc. The problem is there are too many socially challenged IT nerds, engineering geeks and outright criminals joining the ranks of extremists these days, which perhaps needed proper ethical schooling to begin with.

n)       At a general level, the country seems to be struggling to come up with a new national vision, a modern syncretism and cultural renaissance, a new composite identity that could define its character in the 21st century and beyond. As the materialistic angst caused by the modern world is forcing people to seek intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual solace, they are increasingly falling into the trap of fake godmen and terrorists. In the face of cultural challenges, incidents of extreme violence and bestiality are increasing, a problem that the British poet WH Auden put succinctly: “When words lose their meaning, physical forces take over.”[95]

As the threat of terrorism is a sui generis phenomenon, with its origins, scope and impact extending beyond conventional security and military paradigms, covering several ideological, religious, socio-political, economic and at times historical vectors, a purely militaristic and security-centric response to the threat has over the years proven inadequate and in some cases counterproductive.

Therefore, there is a clear need for developing effective counter-radicalization approaches and measures to drain the swamp of radical extremism in order to combat this hideous national security threat.

Some of the counter-radicalization programmes and measure detailed in this paper necessitate further study and empirical study in order to develop a carefully and comprehensively charted blueprint for an overarching counter-radicalization policy − with the involvement of all central and state governments, important think tanks and experts related to the field, as well as influential leaders of all communities − has to be charted and judiciously implemented to counter the dangerous menace of radicalization facing India.



Notes



[1] “Fighting Terrorism”, Arab News, 26 May 2015, http://www.arabnews.com/news/752051
[2] Rik Coolsaet (Ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experience, 2nd edition (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 240.
[3] Minerva Nasser-Eddine, Bridget Garnham, Katerina Agostino and Gilbert Caluya, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review (Canberra: Australian Government, Department of Defence March 2011), p. 13.
[4] Dutch Security Service (AIVD), 2005.
[5] U.K. Home Office, "CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism," July 2011, available at: http://tinyurl.com/5rtjqal (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/counter-terrorismstrategy/ strategycontest?view=Binary).
[6] A. S. Wilner and C. J. Dubouloz, "Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization," Global Change, Peace & Security (formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change) 22:1 (2010): 38.
[7] Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories." Journal of Strategic
[8] Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, The University of South Florida, 2004.
[9] 1994 United Nations Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annex to UN General Assembly resolution 49/60 ,"Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism", of December 9, 1994, UN Doc. A/Res/60/49
[10] Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories." Journal of Strategic
Security 4, no. 4 (2011)
[11] S. Atran, "Pathways to and From Violent Extremism: The Case for Science-Based Field Research," Statement before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities, March 10, 2010.
[12] L. Bokhari, T. Hegghammer, B. Lia, P. Nesser, and T. Tonnessen, "Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terror Networks," FFI Seminar hosted by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (Kjeller, Norway), March 15, 2006.
[13] Doug Saunders, “What Turns Some Western Muslims into Terrorists? The Causes of Terrorism”, The Myth of the Muslim Tide, April 25, 2013 http://dougsaunders.net/2013/04/muslim-immigrants-terrorists-jihad-terrorism/
[14] J. Horgan, presentation at START conference, University of Maryland (1 September 2011). Video- recorded by START.
[15] Doug Saunders, “What Turns Some Western Muslims into Terrorists? The Causes of Terrorism”, The Myth of the Muslim Tide, April 25, 2013 http://dougsaunders.net/2013/04/muslim-immigrants-terrorists-jihad-terrorism/
[16] John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into Terrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (forthcoming); John Horgan, “Deradicalisation or Disengagement? Perspectives on Terrorism,” Volume II, Issue 4; and John Horgan, “Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Perspective,” in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind, NY (New York/London: Routledge, 2009).

[17] Andy Fitzgerald, ‘Being labeled a radical is meant to be an insult. History tells us otherwise’, The Guardian, 20 January 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/20/we-need-radicals-for-social-change

[18] Dr. Alex P. Schmid; Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review; ICCT Research Paper, March 2013
[19] William Saletan, “Muslim McCarthyism”,  Slate.com, March 9, 2011, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2011/03/muslim_mccarthyism.html
[20] Arun Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation: the journey of a concept’, Race & Class, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Oct.-Dec. 2012), p. 3.
[21] Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories." Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011)
[22]  Dr. Alex P. Schmid; Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review; ICCT Research Paper, March 2013
[23] Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, The University of South Florida, 2004
[24] Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 115.
[25] Stefan Malthaner, The Radical Milieu, (Bielefeld: Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung (IKG), November 2010), p. 1;
[26] Defining Terrorism & its Root Causes. References to the definition of terrorism and the root causes as discussed in the United Nations General Assembly debate ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism’, 1 – 5 October, 2001, United Nations, New York.
[27] A.P. Schmid (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 272-79
[29] J. Githens-Mazer and R. Lambert, "Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse," International Affairs 86 (2010)
[30] G. H. McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 473–507.
[31]  Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004),
[32] Dalgaard-Nielsen, Ania, "Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I: The Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory," Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) (Copenhagen), 2008.
[33] Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the West (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005).
[34] C. R. McCauley and M. E. Segal, "Social psychology of terrorist groups," in C. Hendrick (ed.), Group processes and intergroup relations: Review of personality and social psychology (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987): 231–256.
[35] Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, The University of South Florida, 2004.
[36] G. W. Allport, "The historical background of social psychology," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), Handbook of social psychology (New York: Random House, 1954), 5.
[37] L. R. Rambo, Understanding religious conversions (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993).
[38] J. Lofland and N. Skonovd, "Conversion motifs," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 20 (1981): 376.
[39] Walter Laqueur, End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Continuum, 2003).
[40] John Venhaus, "Why Youth Join Al-Qaeda," United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, available at: http://www.usip.org/publications/why-youth-join-al-qaeda.
[41] C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence (2008): 416.

[42] “Malala Yousufzai: Our Books And Pens Are The Most Powerful Weapons,” Education, The Guardian, 12 July 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/12/malala-yousafzai-united-nations-education-speech-text

[43]  Dr. Lindsay Clutterbuck: “Deradicalization Programs and Counter-Terrorism: A Perspective on the Challenges and Benefits,” Middle East Institute, June 10, 2015 http://www.mei.edu/content/deradicalization-programs-and-counterterrorism-perspective-challenges-and-benefits
[44]See John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into Terrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (forthcoming); John Horgan, “Deradicalisation or Disengagement? Perspectives on Terrorism,” Volume II, Issue 4; and John Horgan, “Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Perspective,” in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind, NY (New York/London: Routledge, 2009).
[45] Dr. Lindsay Clutterbuck: “Deradicalization Programs and Counter-Terrorism: A Perspective on the Challenges and Benefits,” Middle East Institute, June 10, 2015 http://www.mei.edu/content/deradicalization-programs-and-counterterrorism-perspective-challenges-and-benefits
[46] Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism. The coChairs are the Executive Office of The SecretaryGeneral (EOSG), the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), and the 1267 Monitoring Team. Other Working Group Members include the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Public Information (DPI), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
[47] From the response of Norwegian Government to the 18 February United Nations CTITF letter, received on 27 March, 2008.
[48] Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, 2008
[49] Cuthbertson I.M 2004, “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists‟, World Policy Journal, vol.21, no.3
[50] Alexandra Klausner, “US Prison camp in Iraq accidentally formed ISIS by housing the most radial jihadists together and allowing them to organize terror group,” The Daily Mail, 31 May 2015,  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3104859/US-Prison-camp-Iraq-accidentally-formed-ISIS-housing-radial-jihadists-allowing-organize-terror-group.html#ixzz3xCY5nfmE 

[51] UK Department of Education, “Protecting Children From Radicalisation: The Prevent Duty”, 1 July 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protecting-children-from-radicalisation-the-prevent-duty

[52] Strobel, Anna, Islam in Österreich. Eine religionssoziologische Untersuchung 

[53] ICP: Islamic Charities Project (formerly known as the Montreux Initiative), Center on Conflict Department and Peacebuilding), http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp/ccdp-research/clusters-and-projects-1/religion_politics/islamic-charities-project.html

[54] Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, 2008
[55] ibid
[56] ibid
[57] National Coordinator For Counterterrorism (NCTb), “Jihadis and the Internet,” Ministries of Justice and interiors, the Netherlands, 2007
[58] www.radicalmiddleway.org, The Radical Middle Way, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, counter-terrorism.org, 2014 https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/554/the-radical-middle-way

[59] Olivia Siong, “New Helpline, Guidebook to Counter Isis Propaganda, Radical Ideology,” Channel News Asia, 09 June 2015 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/new-helpline-guidebook-to/1902416.html

[60] Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, 2008
[61] Tsoukala Anastassia, “Democracy Against Security: the debates about CounterTerrorism in the
European Parliament,” September 2001June 2003, in Liberty and Security, Monday 14 February 2005, at http://www.libertysecurity.org/article137.html
[62] Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, 2008
[63] ibid
[64] Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare”, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008
[65] Ibid
[66] ibid
[67] Marisa L. Porges, “The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment”, Council on Foreign Relations website, January 22, 2010. http://www.cfr.org/radicalization-and-extremism/saudi-deradicalization-experiment/p21292
[68] ibid
[69] Dominic Casciani, “The Prevent Strategy And Its Problems”, BBC News website, 26 August 2014 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28939555
[70] Theresa May, “Prevent Strategy,” Her Majesty’s Government, 2011, 107

[71] “State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron”, BBC News website, 05 February 2011

[72] Frank Gardner, “Prevent Strategy: Is it failing to stop radicalization”, BBC News website, 06 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31756755
[73] ibid
[74] Bharti Jain, “Centre, states firm up steps to counter IS radicalization threat”, The Times of India, August 2, 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Centre-states-firm-up-steps-to-counter-IS-radicalization-threat/articleshow/48313511.cms
[75] Ibid
[76] Shweta Desai, India Turns to a Soft Approach to Prevent Radicalisation, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), September 28, 2015 http://www.claws.in/1443/india-turns-to-a-soft-approach-to-prevent-radicalisation-shweta-desai.html
[77] ibid
[78] Friedrich Nietzsche, Aphorism 156, Beyond Good and Evil
[79] Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker, “US Officials Retool Slogan for Terror War”, The New York Times, July 26, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/26/politics/us-officials-retool-slogan-for-terror-war.html?_r=0
[80]    HA Hellyer, ‘Colonialism fuelled modern forms of extremism’, The National, August 9, 2014
[81]“Islamist Terrorism From 1945 to the Rise of ISIS,” Constitutional Rights Foundation, http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/islamist-terrorism-from-1945-to-the-death-of-osama-bin-laden.html

[82]    “Islamic Radicalism: Its Wahhabi Roots and Current Representation,” The Islamic Supreme Council of America, http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/anti-extremism/7-islamic-radicalism-its-wahhabi-roots-and-current-representation.html
[83]    “Islam in Iran: The Roots of Political Shi’ism,” Encyclopedia Iranica, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/islam-in-iran-x-the-roots-of-political-shiisms
[84] Patrick Goodenough, “British PM: ‘Root Cause’ of Terror is ‘Extremist Narrative,’ not Poverty, Foreign Policy”, November 14, 2014, CNS News, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/british-pm-root-cause-terror-extremist-narrative-not-poverty-foreign

[85]    “The Persecution Complex: The Religious Right’s Deceptive Rallying Cry,” People for the American Way, http://www.pfaw.org/rww-in-focus/persecution-complex-religious-right-s-deceptive-rallying-cry
[86]     Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?”, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress Washington, DC, September 1999, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf
[87]    Mustafa Hashim Taha, “Gratifying the Self by Demonising the Other,” Sage Journals, 1 May 2014, http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/4/2/2158244014533707
[88]    Alex P. Schmidt., “Al-Qaeda’s Single Narrative and Attempts to Build Counter-Narratives,” ICCT Research Paper, January 2014, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Schmid-Al-Qaeda's-Single-Narrative-and-Attempts-to-Develop-Counter-Narratives-January-2014.pdf
[89] William D. Casebeer and James A. Russell, “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive Storytelling Strategy”, Strategic Insights Vol IV, Issue 3, Center for Contemporary Conflict, March 2005 http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/casebeer_mar05.pdf
[90]    “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism,” International Center for Counter Terrorism, the Hague, September 2014
[91]    Dr BB T. Van Ginkle LLM,  “Responding to Cyber Jihad: Towards an Effective Cyber Jihad” ICCT Research Paper, March 2015
[92] Ibid
[93]             Mahatma Gandhi, Young India, 22 October, 1925
[94]    “The Role of Civil Society in Countering Radicalization and Deradicalization,” A Working Paper of the European Policy Planners’ Network on Countering Radicalization and Polarization (PPN), http://www.strategicdialogue.org/PPN%20Paper%20-%20Community%20Engagement_FORWEBSITE.pdf
[95]    W. H. Auden, The Art of Poetry No. 17, Interviewed by  Michael Newman, The Paris Review

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