Published with title - 'Countering The Threat of Radicalisation:Theories, Programmes and Challenges
in Journal of Defence Studies, IDSA
(April 2016 issue, Vol: 10, Issue 2)
“The root cause of terrorism … is the extremist
narrative… not poverty or foreign policy.”
-
British Prime Minister David Cameron
For
about a decade, the global campaign against terrorism has regarded the
dissemination of radical ideologies by various terrorist organizations and
religious institutions, as one of the most important reasons for the spread of
terrorism. Therefore, over 40 governments around the world have launched
indigenously developed counter-radicalization programmes, in keeping their political
and socio-cultural conditions, in order to “drain” the proverbial swamp of
radical extremism.
In
this regard, India has only recently taken cautious and deliberate steps toward
building counter-radicalization policy and programmes, which has underscored
the need for deeper research and analysis of the subject.
This
paper aims to explore the various aspects of counter-radicalization and its
role in the larger campaign against terrorism. Given the wide scope of the
subject, the paper undertakes a normative and exploratory analytical approach. At
present, there is little substantive research or empirical study available on
the disparate counter-radicalization programmes implemented around the world,
which are themselves subject to constant and often drastic changes and
revisions.
As
most counter-radicalization programmes today are primarily directed toward
combating the most immediate and alarming threat posed by Islamic
radicalization, this paper covers anti-jihadist radicalization in greater
detail.
Contents
In
the aftermath of the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings of 2005,
the concept of “counter-radicalization” has gained importance in
counter-terrorism policy-making as it seeks to explain and counter the process
by which ordinary people become willing to carry out acts of mass violence,
even against their fellow citizens. However, several social activists and even
counter-terrorism experts have expressed apprehensions over the excessive focus
on so-called “counter-radicalization” measures and criticize the very premise
of the “radicalization” process and the stated connection between extremist thought
and opinion and extremist violence and terrorism. Some of these conceptual
confusions are highlighted in Chapter II of the Study titled: “Conceptual
Confusions in an Ideological War”.
Chapter
III of the study titled: “Character Arc of a Terrorist: Radical Thought to
Violent Action”, explores the various theoretical models and frameworks,
counter-radicalization experts have developed to explain the transition of an
ordinary citizen into a radical and violent extremist or terrorist, and seeks
to understand the motivations and circumstances that abet the transformation.
The
differences between anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and
deradicalization programmes around the world, and related measures initiated by
countries around the world are covered in Chapter IV: “Reversing
Radicalization: The Global Response”. This chapter also details some features
of the Saudi PRAC and the UK’s ‘Prevent’ counter-radicalization and
deradicalization programmes, as well as India’s steady and deliberate progress
in developing its own comprehensive counter-radicalization campaign.
Chapter V titled
“Extremist Fiction and Development of Effective Counter-Narratives,” seeks to
explore the commonalities in all extremist narratives and the contours for
developing effective counter-narratives. The concluding Chapter: “Recommended
Social and Institutional Changes in India,” offers some recommendations toward
developing effective measures against the growing threat of radicalization in
the country.
I.
Conceptual Confusions in an
Ideological War
“Terrorism
is a psychological warfare. Terrorists try to manipulate us and change our
behavior by creating fear, uncertainty and division in society.”[1]
-
Patrick J. Kennedy
a)
The Difficulty of Definition
Just like the term ‘terrorism’, there
exists a great deal of confusion and debate over the proper meaning and
definition of the term ‘radicalization’. In fact, this difficulty has led to a
critical wariness among some experts as attempts at reaching an acceptable and
comprehensive definition of the term has proven unsuccessful. For example,
Belgian counter-terrorism expert Rik Coolsaet, part of an Expert Group on
Violent Radicalisation established by the European Commission, has described
the very notion of radicalisation as ‘ill-defined, complex and controversial.”[2]
Again, an Australian team of analysts recently concluded that “about the only
thing that radicalisation experts agree on is that radicalisation is a process.
Beyond that there is considerable variation as to make existing research
incomparable”.[3]
Still, various state intelligence and
security services have come up with their own “working definitions” for the
term and its related concepts. Thus, the Dutch Security Service (AIVD) defines
radicalization as: “Growing readiness to pursue and/or support—if necessary by
undemocratic means — far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or
pose a threat to, the democratic order.”[4]
Under its CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, the UK’s Home Office has referred
to radicalization simply as: “The process by which people come to support
terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist
groups.”[5]
According to Wilner and Dubouloz, “Radicalization
is a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social,
and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular
goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and
emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent
behavior.”[6]
If the definition of
‘radicalization’ has been problematic, so has been the discussion on the
distinction between ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’. Individuals who play a
significant role in radicalization of others and indirectly participate in
facilitating acts of terrorism, through their words and actions, come under the
category of ‘violent extremists’ (VE).[7]
Scholars also divide extremism into two categories. The so-called “benign” form
of extremism concentrates more in propagating and promoting the concepts of its
radical or totalitarian cause, whereas the malevolent form of seeks the
“destruction of those (concepts and forces) that oppose it”.[8]
As for terrorism, the
international community is yet to formulate an accepted comprehensive
definition of the term. However, The United Nations General Assembly has used
the following political description of terrorism since 1994: “Criminal acts
intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a
group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that
may be invoked to justify them.”[9]
b)
Radicalization and Terror: Is there
a Definite Connection?
In their response to the escalating
threat of violent extremism and terrorism around the world, several governments
have launched disparate CVE (countering violent extremism) programs to arrest
the proliferation of radical and extremist ideologies in society by violent
non-state actors. This process of an individual’s transformation from a
moderate, law-abiding citizen into an active anti-state extremist is referred
to as Radicalization into Violent Extremism (RVE),[10]
or more commonly as “radicalization”.
Radicalization presupposes the principal
role played by the agents of certain radical political and religious
organizations in misguiding impressionable minds into joining their ranks and
into committing crimes of violent extremism and terrorism, through a process of
dubious proselytizing and indoctrination aimed at justifying such acts.
However, several terrorism experts insist that the process of such ideological
indoctrination and radicalization is not the sole and often not the main cause
behind the transformation of a peace-abiding individual into a violent
extremists or terrorist. Empirical evidence shows that terrorists often never
receive formal indoctrination and do not undergo a process of radicalization
before joining an extremist or terrorist organization. Many of them are usually
drawn into radical organizations for a variety of other reasons, such as
familial ties or criminal affiliations etc.[11]
Conversely, opinion polls conducted over decades reveal that even when large
sections of a population or a community may claim to be supportive of radical
ideologies and extremist violence, they never actively support or participate
in carrying out acts of terrorism.[12]
Olivier Roy, the noted French scholar of
Islamic society, states that even jihadi terrorism “shares many factors with
other forms of dissent, either political or behavioral. Most radicals have
broken with their families; they don’t mention traditions of Islam or fatwas,
but rather act on an individual basis and outside the usual bonds of family, mosque
and Islamic association. Modern Islamic terrorism is an avatar of ultra-leftist
radicalism—its targets are the same as the traditional targets of the
ultra-left—US imperialism, symbols of globalization.”[13]
Again scholars like John Horgan note
that “the relationship between radicalisation and terrorism is poorly
understood … Not every radical becomes a terrorist and not every terrorist
holds radical views”.[14]
Thus, extremist ideology and violent
action are often but not always connected to each other and therefore an
excessive focus of some countries on counter-radicalization programs as a means
to confront the threat of terrorism is often questioned. Again, the plans of
certain European countries to curb the activities of avowedly non-violent
extremist organizations, which allegedly radicalize credulous minds, has also
comes in for a lot of criticism and it is charged that certain religious and
ideological groups are unjustifiably targeted. It is contended that terrorists
are often radicalized by factors like sense of political alienation and
disenfranchisement, perceived persecution and discrimination, socio-cultural
and psychological factors rather than the extreme ideals of a radical ideology
per se.[15]
c)
Do we need counter radicalization
programmes?
In the wake of these issues, many experts have questioned
the need for investing in counter-radicalization programmes. However, it is
noteworthy that many countries faced the menace of radicalization after the
9/11 terror attacks and the Iraq war of 2003, where thousands of young radicals
in various countries were arrested, convicted or imprisoned, often with little
inculpatory evidence against them. The question then arose as to how to manage
these radicalized individuals during their period of imprisonment and how to
mitigate the potential threat they might pose to society after their release.[16]
It is in this context that several countries developed
various anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and de-radicalization
programs to encourage disengagement and deradicalization of these individuals
from the path of violent extremism. Thus, many radicalized detainees were put
under surveillance, monitoring and training courses. Programs include consular
assignments, religious rehab, educational and vocational rehab, community and
family rehab, recreational rehab as well as care and custody.
Over the years many radical extremists were rescued from
joining the ranks of terrorist organizations and have been successfully
rehabilitated as responsible citizens of society. It is pointed out that a
marginal rate of recidivism does not invalidate the good work done in rescuing
thousands of misguided individuals from joining the forces of terrorism.
d)
Is Radicalization the Right Word?
There is also a school of scholarship to
which radicalization is not a negative term in itself as it believes the identification
of an ideology or group as radical or moderate depends on the political context
leading to its emergence. It is contended that most revolutionaries of modern
political thought, even the proponents of individual freedom and human rights
(like Thomas Jefferson and Nelson Mandela) were radical leaders espousing
violence to achieve their revolutionary goals. Therefore, radicalism that
opposes state oppression in and of itself is not a negative term and that all
of human progress is the creation of the radical mind that opposes conventional
beliefs or the established order.
Again, it is contended that the use of
counter-terrorism and
counter-radicalization programs by some governments are not merely directed
against violent extremism, but are a covert attempt at curtailing civil
liberties and human rights in order to exert state control over various facets
of individual thought, liberty and private enterprise.[17]
Meanwhile some experts like Arun
Kundnani and Alex P. Schmid argue that the very concept of radicalization has
gained currency because it is viewed as being directed against Islamic
extremism and therefore it has “become a political shibboleth despite its lack
of precision.”[18]
Some point out that the word “radicalization” came into its present use
following the 7/7 terror attacks in July 2005 and that the practice of
searching radicalized individuals in the UK and the US is leading to so-called
“Muslim McCarthyism”.[19]
Thus, Arun Kundnani notes: “Following
the neoconservative paradigm, models of radicalisation tend to assume that
extremist religious ideology drives terrorism. In addition, as with the
neoconservatives, they focus overwhelmingly on acts of violence carried out by
Muslims and rarely address political violence and terrorism more generally … For
some radicalisation analysts, the role of extremist religious ideology in this
process is akin to a “conveyor belt” that mechanically pushes an individual
into terrorism. This implies that, once someone has adopted the extremist
ideology, terrorism is likely to follow sooner or later. For others, this
process is more complex and depends not only on ideology but also on
psychological factors, such as the experience of a recent traumatic event.
Whatever nuances are added to the picture, the underlying assumption in
radicalisation models is usually the same: that some form of religious ideology
is a key element in turning a person into a terrorist. This analysis has
underpinned counter-terrorism policy-making in the UK since 2006 and led to
viewing certain forms of religious ideology as an early warning sign of
potential terrorism.”[20]
Under the cloud of such conceptual and
ideological dissonance within academic circles, governments around the world
have struggled to develop cogent and effective counter-terrorism and
counter-radicalization programs or effectively coordinate their activities in
charting a coherent global campaign against the growing menace of violent
extremism.
However, the fact remains that various
terrorist organizations around the world are conducting highly violent
campaigns aimed at destabilizing the global socio-political order in pursuance
of their extreme and divisive ideologies, and in the process are weaning away many
bright and impressionable minds to their devious ideological cause. Clearly,
this menace needs to be confronted at religious, ideological and the
socio-political level, which underscores the need for counter-radicalization
measures by societies and states in unison.
e)
The Multiplicity of Causes and
Catalysts
Since the late 1960s, academic research
has grappled with the question of the causes and reasons behind a person
adopting beliefs and behaviors that lead him or her to engage in subversive or
terrorist activities.
Several studies have attempted an answer
by analyzing terrorist activity at different levels: individual, group,
network, organization, mass movement, socio-cultural context, and
international/interstate contexts.[21]
For a long time, scholars concentrated
on the reasons for a person’s transformation into a violent extremist at the
psychological and individual level. However, its causes are now viewed not just
at an individual level, but also at social and larger geo-political levels:[22]
Micro-level,
i.e. the causes and catalysts leading to the radicalization of an individual at
the psychological level pertain to identity problems, failed integration with
society, feelings of alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, relative
deprivation, humiliation (direct or by proxy), stigmatisation and rejection,
often combined with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge. Closely
attached to these problems are problems of confusion caused by inherent crisis
of splintered identity and loyalty (patriotism vs. communal loyalty), the clash
of values (liberal vs conservative, state philosophy vs. religious/ideological
indoctrination), childhood abuse/disturbed adolescence, low self and low social
esteem, alienation and de-individuation, rebel identity and counter culture,
cognitive readjustment of self-sanction to violence, misanthropic and
sociopathic tendencies etc.[23]
Meso-level,
This level refers to the radical milieu in the immediate social environment
(“the supportive or even complicit social surround”) which fosters the
radicalization of individuals, groups leading to the formation of terrorist
organizations.[24]
At this communal or societal level there
is a heightened sense of religious or racial ethnocentricity, xenophobia,
perceptions of injustice and discrimination, heightened sense of desperation
and disenfranchisement, low personal and social esteem, extreme historical
memory and ideological indoctrination, sense of betrayal, breakdown of law and
order, growing polarization of society, the decline of scientific temper,
proliferation of rabid extremist thought and tendencies in society etc.
Macro-level,
i.e. role of national politics and governance issues within a country or
geopolitical events around the world in the radicalisation of public opinion.
Such issues could include tense majority – minority relationships, the lack of
socio-economic opportunities for certain class or community of people, national
or international wars or conflicts involving religious or ideological issues,
the growing influence of transnational terrorist radicalization and recruitment
activities, proliferation of failed states and civil strife, etc.[25]
We can add to these the usual litany of
so-called “root causes” behind terrorism, which would serve the process of
radicalization just as well. Some of these “root causes” were enumerated by
spokespersons from around 170 countries following the September 11, 2001
attacks in the UN General Assembly, and a sample is listed below:[26]
∙
Communities struck by poverty,
disease, illiteracy, bitter hopelessness (Armenia);
∙
Social inequality,
marginalization and exclusion (Benin);
∙
Political oppression, extreme poverty and the violation
of basic rights (Costa Rica);
∙
Injustices,
misery, starvation, drugs, exclusion, prejudices, despair for lack of
perspectives (Dominican Republic);
∙ Oppression
of
peoples in several parts of the world, particularly in Palestine (Malaysia);
∙
Alienation
of the young in situations of economic deprivation and political tension
and uncertainty, sense of injustice and lack of hope (New Zealand);
∙ Rejection
of the West with all its cultural dimensions
(Palestine);
∙
Hunger, poverty, deprivation, fear, despair,
absence of sense of belonging to the human family (Namibia);
∙
Situations which lead to misery,
exclusion, reclusion, the injustices which lead to growing frustration,
desperation and exasperation (Senegal).
For
its part, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research identifies more than 50
different alleged ‘causes’. Some of the causes mentioned are the following:[27]
•
Terrorism is rooted in political discontent;
•
A culture of alienation and humiliation can act as a kind of growth
medium in which the process of radicalisation commences and virulent extremism
comes to thrive;
•
A collective or individual desire for revenge against acts of repression
may be motive enough for terrorist activity;
•
The failure to mobilize popular support for a radical political program may
trigger the decision to employ terrorism in order to engineer a violent
confrontation with the authorities;
•
Modern terrorism occurs because modern circumstances make terrorist methods
exceptionally easy;
•
The choice of terrorism represents the outcome of a learning process from own
experiences and the experiences of others.
II.
Character Arc of a Terrorist:
Radical Thought to Violent Action
-
Voltaire
Many
Paths to the Dark Side
In spite of all this literature and
after about 40 years of research into the study of terrorism, research into the
process of ‘radicalization’ into violent extremist action is “conceptual rather
than empirical” and remains “poorly understood”.[29]
However, early assumptions that the “aberrant behavior” was the consequence of
some mental or personality abnormality have been convincingly debunked.
Although the exact mechanisms and processes of radicalization remain a matter
of debate, it is clear that a different set of pathways and circumstances
affect people in different stages of life in transitioning to the dark side.
Thus radicalization is not viewed as “the product of a single decision but the
end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward
a commitment to violence over time.”[30]
Again, the process of radicalization
cannot be inextricably linked to recruitment in violently extreme or terrorist
organizations. For example, Marc Sageman avers that there is no recruitment per
se to militant jihad or to Al-Qaeda. He presents a study that shows that
nearly 90% “join the jihad” through friendship and kinship.[31]
However, it is also true that terrorist organizations engage in radicalization
programs through propaganda not only to influence vulnerable minds toward
accepting their points of view, but also to draw recruits. Terrorist groups,
like the ISIS, brazenly urge Muslims around the world, through their online
literature and social media websites, to migrate to territories under the
group’s control and “join the jihad” as part of
a so-called religious obligation.
Academic
Theories on The Radicalization Process
Over the years, scholars have propounded
various theories to explain the process of transition changing a person from
being an average citizen to a violent extremist that radicalization effects,
but many contemporary researchers often question the conclusions of these theoretical
frameworks in the contemporary context. Still, there are some noteworthy
theoretical approaches, such as those derived from the social movement theory,
social psychology, and conversion theory, which remain useful in exploring the
processes and the drivers of radicalization.
i)
The Social Movement Theory (SMT): The
basic idea behind this theory, which was propounded in the 1940s, is that
radical social movements rise from strained socio-political conditions, which
fester in a mass sentiment of discontent. People join such movements as they
passively succumb to overpowering social forces. In contemporary times, a new
school of SMT has come up with the so-called Framing Theory.
ii)
[32]
According to it, the ideologues of any radical movement attempt to frame
messages in ways that to them will best resonate with the interests, attitudes,
and beliefs of their potential constituency.
According
to its proponents, the Framing Theory is useful for understanding
radicalization because it focuses on processes, not socio-demographics, and
because it emphasizes a mid-level analysis. Applying this framework, an
important study was recently conducted by Quintan Wiktorowicz which looked into
the way people came to join extremist Islamist groups in Western countries.[33]
By employing the SMT framework, Wiktorowicz presented a four-component
development model for radicalization. The study found that many Westerners and
educated people who become radicalized initially showed an openness to
accepting new and differing worldviews (called “cognitive opening”). Soon they
see in a religion or a particular socio-political ideology a life of
significance and meaning and eventually accept a group’s narrative and ethos,
which to them “makes sense” (termed as “frame alignment”). Eventually through a
process of greater interaction with members of an extremist group, they become
fully indoctrinated into the movement. In fact, this process is quite similar
to the process of any individual’s conversion to any religion or
socio-political group or organization.
iii)
Social Psychology: Many
theories of social psychology shed remarkable insight into how individuals
become radicalized once they get associated with an extremist or terrorist
organization and commit acts which they could not have imagined committing on
their own. According to them, the process of change into violent extremism
starts after an individual joins an extremist organization. For over two
decades, Bryn Mawr and Clark McCauley[34]
have been one of the most consistent voices of social psychology in the field
of terrorism studies. These scholars applied various tenets of social
psychology to find out that “individual opinions and attitudes tend to become
more extreme in a group context. Group opinions and attitudes also tend to be
more extreme than those held by its individual members, a phenomenon often
referred to as “group polarization.”
Again,
individuals feel less responsible for “group” actions as they diffuse
accountability over the entire group. Thus, there is a greater disregard for
carrying out immoral and extremely violent actions. This “diffusion and
displacement of responsibility” often leads to the so-called “de-individuation”
of a horrible act by the perpetrator and the person often points to the dubious
moral justification learnt from the group and worse by blaming the victim or by
speaking of them in dehumanizing terms. In psychological terms, this tendency
is known as “the cognitive readjustment of self-sanction”.[35]
In
addition, radical and socially isolated groups tend to deepen
“in-group/out-group bias” and exercise greater control on the behavior of
members.[36]
Often people join certain radical groups because of perceived rewards or gains,
acceptance and recognition within a community, and not out of any strong
ideological convictions towards the philosophy of the group.
Thus,
the reasons for joining extremist groups are dynamic and variable for different
individuals. Whereas for some social affiliation or personal sense of meaning
and life purpose may be the reason, while others may find a sense of adventure
and excitement appealing. Many young recruits may come from broken homes or a
family having a criminal background. They may be taking revenge on larger
society that did not accept them and so these people develop a rebel identity
and develop a counter culture by joining the ranks of these groups.
(iii)
Conversion Theory: Focusing on the psychology of the individual going
through the radicalization process and given the fact that many contemporary
extremist movements follow an avowedly religious ideology or cause, many
theorists have studied the process of religious conversion itself (which can
happen with people converting from outside the religion or from within the
religious community itself to a more radically extreme version followed by a
radical group).
On
the basis of decades of study into developmental or stage models in the study
of religious conversions, Lewis Rambo has developed a seven-component model
which has been found among most extremist converts.[37]
Researchers
have found several “conversion motifs” that lead a person to adopt a new religious
ideology, with or without direct external influence.
These
include “intellectual motif” (by reading books, through the Internet,
television or other media), “mystical” (which relates to personally
transformative epiphany or moment of supposed spiritual enlightenment),
“experimental” (where a seeker connects with a group to find an identity of
group membership), “affectional or romantic” (where conversion results either
from strong emotional sentiment, attachment or bonding), “revivalist” (refers to
a transformative experience occurring in the context of a crowd); and
“coercive” ( where people capitulate to group pressure and influences into
accepting a radical viewpoint).[38]
Profile
of the Typical Radical
After several decades of intense study,
terrorism experts have found no single definitive process or profile for
identifying a prospective radical extremist or terrorist, in terms of his or
her demographic or socio-economic background. In fact, Walter Lacquer states
that the quest for a “general theory” is misguided because: “Many terrorisms
exist and their character has changed over time and from country to country.”[39]
This is also applicable to the
radicalization process itself. In spite of several attempts to articulate a
general sequence of stages or issues that might apply across and within group
types, there is no clear answer on how people come to adopt violent extremist
ideologies to justify their use of terrorist violence.
In recent times, researchers like John
Venhaus, have conducted an in-depth study of the life and motivations of
Al-Qaeda fighters. Based on interviews and personal histories of 2,032 “foreign
fighters” who sought to affiliate with jihadi groups, Venhaus found that “they
all were looking for something … they wanted to know who they are, why they
matter, and what their role in the world should be. They have an unfulfilled
need to define themselves which Al-Qaeda offers to fill.”[40]
Thus, he categorized most radicalized jihadi recruits into four categories:
a)
The Revenge Seeker:
Highly frustrated and angry militant, seeking to commit violence against
certain people, group or entity, whom he or she believes are at fault.
b)
The Status Seeker:
A social misfit seeking recognition and esteem by joining a militant
organization.
c)
The Identity Seeker:
Driven by a need to belong or be part of something meaningful, which would
define the person’s identity.
d)
The Thrill Seeker:
The thrill and adventure seekers were found to be less than 5 percent of the
lot, whose main motivation in joining a terrorist group is to pursue,
excitement, adventure and glory.
It would be wrong to rigidly
compartmentalize the types as there is often a great deal of overlap across all
these categories. For their part, MacCauley and Masolenko[41]
have classified individual mechanisms of radicalization in the following ways:
individual radicalization through personal grievance, through political
grievance, gradual process of radicalization through association with terrorist
group (the slippery slope), radicalization through love or emotional bond with
radicals, radicalization caused by a destabilizing life event (a real or
perceived injustice or being a victim of violence or oppression),
radicalization to seek life purpose, adventure or status among outlaws.
III.
Reversing Radicalization: The
Global Response
“The
best way to fight terrorism is not through guns. It’s through pens, books,
teachers and schools”[42]
-
Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala
Yousufzai
a)
Anti-Radicalization,
Counter-Radicalization and Deradicalization Measures
Surprisingly,
conceptual confusion regarding the definition of ‘radicalization’ extends to
the understanding of measures developed to counter the process of
radicalization.
After several years of
deliberations, strategists seem to have largely agreed upon the differing
connotations for these terms.[43]
We
are told that the issue here is not a matter of syntactical nuance, as each
term refers to a separate and specific set of measures employed to reverse the
process of radicalization in different stages of its lactic cycle with
characteristic behavior, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).
Thus,
anti-radicalization programs are launched to protect segments of population
that have only recently come under the influence of radicalization and
cover measures related to detection and developing deterrence.
Counter-radicalization
campaigns aim to target those radicalized elements that may have not yet joined
forces of violent extremism or terrorism and could be rescued before they
attempt the dangerous transition. The measures suited to counter-terrorism
operations include disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration programs.
The third category
pertains to de-radicalization programs, which are devised for those individuals
who may have already aided, abetted or committed acts of violent extremism.[44]
Thus these measures cover post-surrender and post-detention programs.
Many of these behavior
modification programmes include ideological or religious counseling, vocational
education, recreational and psychological rehab, inter-religious or
inter-communal discourse programs, post-release surveillance and care, as well
as involvement of family members and civil society to foster rehabilitation
etc.
b)
Global Response to Radicalization
Many countries faced
the menace of radicalization for the first time after the 9/11 terror attacks
and the Iraq war of 2003, when thousands of young radicals in various countries
were arrested, convicted or imprisoned, often with little inculpatory evidence
against them. The question then arose on how to manage these radicalized
individuals during their period of imprisonment and how to mitigate the
potential threat they might pose to society after their release.[45] It is in this context that several countries
developed various anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and de-radicalization
programs to encourage disengagement of these radicals from the path of violent
extremism. Thus, many radicalized detainees were put on ongoing surveillance,
monitoring and training courses.
About 40 countries in
the world are currently running various indigenously developed
anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes and
campaigns. These can be broadly categorized into ten key categories.[46]
i.
Engaging and working with civil
society: As a government may
not always have the resources to counter radicalization and to stop violent
extremism from spreading, civil societies and local communities can bring to
bear a range of tools and informally reach out to a wider population. In fact,
working with communities and civil society enhances trust and transparency and
strengthens social cohesion. Therefore, several countries have developed
programmes to engage local communities in efforts to counter radicalization
processes. One such programme is Norway’s Exit Project (established in 1997),
which seeks to support young people who want to disengage with or leave radical
racist or other violent extremist groups (e.g. neo-Nazi groups).[47]
Meanwhile, the Russian government has set up consultative organizations for
enhancing cooperation with civil society groups in order to promote
inter-ethnic relations, prevention of extremism, xenophobia and ethnic
conflicts at regional and local levels. For its part, Singapore is fostering
engagement with religious minorities to discredit and debunk the false
propaganda by extremist organizations.[48]
ii.
Prison Programmes:
The
incarceration of violent extremists and terrorists in prisons has led to
serious issues for various countries. Highly radicalized extremists have found
ways of turning prisons into their own training camps. This has raised the
issue of whether it is better to separate such extremists from other inmates or
to allow them to mix freely with others.
“Allowing violent extremists to mix freely has carried serious costs in
allowing them to seek out and successfully recruit fellow prisoners; but
evidence also shows that segregating extremists in separate blocks has allowed
them to maintain an organizational hierarchy and hone their operational
skills.”[49]
Saudi Arabia has gone to the extent of establishing
new and special prisons for violent extremists, which not only separates them
from regular detainees but also separates them from each other in individual
cells. Several other countries have developed similar facilities that aim to
prevent prisons from becoming breeding grounds for terrorism and a poll for
recruitment. It is to be noted that most of the top leadership of the ISIS,
including Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, were incarcerated in Camp Bucca in Iraq, which
had veritably turned into a training camp for the nascent terror organization
in its early days.[50]
In addition, various prisons have been running several deradicalization
programs, such as in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, which provide psychological
counseling, religious counseling and correct religious teaching, vocational
training and other prison programmes that could help prisoners disengage
themselves from radical groups and join public life as law-abiding citizens
once they leave prisons.
iii.
Education Programmes:
Education features prominently in counter-radicalisation programmes developed
by various countries, given the important role of schools and educational
establishments in promoting the values
of nonviolence, peaceful coexistence and tolerance. In multi-cultural United
Kingdom, for example, authorities work closely with providers of education at
all levels. This has resulted in the teaching in schools of subjects that
promote intercultural understanding and citizenship. Through schemes like
“Children’s Plan”, state officials engage directly with head-teachers in order
to ensure their access to all forms of support needed, as well as ensuring
support for young, vulnerable people who may be exposed to violent extremist
influences.[51]
In Austria, school curricula and religious education
classes instruct against intolerance as part of civic education.[52]
Meanwhile, Belgian educational authorities have designed educational programmes
to inform pupils and parents about the dangers pertaining to violent extremism
and terrorism, and have also developed special educational programmes to combat
violent extremist beliefs and promote tolerance and coexistence.
iv.
Promoting alliance of civilizations
and intercultural dialogue: Several alliances and initiatives
that promote intercultural dialogue and understanding to counter radicalisation
have been launched by various countries around the world. For instance, New
Zealand’s efforts to counter violent extremism has led it to co-sponsor
“Asia-Pacific Interfaith Dialogue” that brings together 15 representatives of
the major faith and community groups in the Southeast Asian and South Pacific
regions. Similarly, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in
cooperation with Islamic charities launched the “Montreux Initiative” in 2005[53]
to help counter extreme ideologies. In Thailand, moderate Muslim organizations
from abroad are being invited to exchange views and ideas with local religious
leaders in order to enrich an understanding of Islam and promote true religious
teaching. Thailand has also played a significant role in supporting Dialogue on
Interfaith Cooperation (Indonesia, 2004), the AsiaMiddle East Dialogue (AMED),
the AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM) Interfaith Dialogue,[54]
and it has cosponsored the Informal Meeting of Leaders on Interfaith Dialogue
and Cooperation for Peace during the 60 th Session of the UNGA. Italy’s
Ministry for Youth and Sport, jointly with the Ministry of Interior, set up a
Youth Advisory Board in 2006 for religious and cultural dialogue.
v.
Tackling Economic And Social
Inequalities: Although empirical research does not
show any direct link between economic and social inequalities and the incidence
of terrorism or violent extremism, with terrorists and extremists coming from
all economic backgrounds, several countries have undertaken policies to tackle
social and economic discrimination against minority communities. For example,
the Netherlands has introduced several schemes for youths belonging to certain
sections of society, susceptible to the influence of radicalization, to have
fair prospects of employment in the labor market. The government also provides
language training to communities of foreign origin and is facilitating the
schooling and education of the young belonging to these poor communities.[55]
Algeria provides direct financial and welfare support to victims of violent
extremism, whereas Saudi Arabia and Malaysia provide tuition fees, medical
treatment, and financial support for food and clothing. Malaysia even looks
after the families of the detainees.[56]
This helps in deterring other members of a radical’s family from joining the
ranks of extremist groups.
vi.
Countering Radicalization on the
Internet: Terrorist organizations have successfully taken
advantage of the great benefits of the Internet – low cost, ease of access,
lack of censorship or regulations in most countries, vast audience and fast
communication and flow of information – in order to disseminate their message
of hate and gain more recruits.[57]
Many
governments have sought to intervene in this matter through censorship,
monitoring and counter-propaganda programmes. The United Kingdom Government is
now supporting mainstream voices to articulate a moderate understanding of
various religions in the country. One example is the government’s active
support and encouragement for the “Radical Middle Way” project,[58]
where young Muslims can access a wide range of views and opinions from all the
major Muslim schools of thought. Meanwhile, Nigeria conducts forums and
conferences on combating terrorism through the Internet. The Singapore
government encourages moderate religious scholars and teachers to launch
websites which carry arguments that rebut violent extremist teachings and
beliefs.[59]
vii.
Legislation Reforms: Several
countries have introduced legislation that prohibit the dissemination of
extremist literature, the delivery of hate speeches, incitement to racism,
xenophobia and violence. Canada is one of the earliest countries to have
enacted a law criminalizing incitement to extremist violence (1985) and hate
crimes.[60]
France has also enacted laws against groups that promote discrimination, hatred
and violence towards a person or a group of people based on their ethnic origin
or religious, racial or ideological affiliation.[61]
Algeria has used its legislation to create a national consensus and
reconciliation programme. Thus, the President is able to pardon and/or reduce
the sentences of individuals who have been convicted of committing violent
extremist acts if they have not committed mass murder, rape or were involved in
causing explosions in public places.
viii.
Rehabilitation Programmes: Several
countries around the world have initiated rehabilitation programmes that
deradicalize detainees charged with crimes of violent extremism in order to
reintegrate them into society once their prison term ends. For example, Saudi
Arabia has designed a special programme − Al-Ria’ya (translated as “care”),
which transfers detained extremists to specially designed facilities.
This
programme provides psychological counseling, correct religious education that
teaches tolerance and moderation. Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have their
own set of religious counseling programmes and other deradicalization measures.
ix.
Developing and Disseminating
Information: Several countries have developed close
cooperation with each other in conducting counter-radicalization programs, and
some states in Europe have developed integrated information systems on those
involved in making hate speeches and incitement to terrorism, both inside and
outside the European Union. Most
notably, The Italian Central Directorate of Prevention Police has recently
launched a project with the European Group of Six 42 relating to the sharing
and analysis of information on the movement of so-called “itinerant preachers”.
[62]
x.
Training of Agencies Involved In
Counter-Radicalisation Policies: Some countries have
introduced training and qualification programmes for their officials and
community workers involved in counter-radicalization programmes. The US, Canada
and Belgium conduct special training programmes to their police and law enforcement
agencies in matters related to special aspects of their community’s religious
and cultural sensibilities and the way investigations against extremism should
be conducted by taking members of a religious community into confidence.
In 2003, Norwegian Police Security Service set out
police personnel to identify activities related to the radicalization of youth
by right-wing extremists and to carry out “preventive conversations” with youth
from falling prey to violent extremism.[63]
c)
Two Case Studies: The Saudi and
British Counter-Radicalization Programmes
i)
Saudi Prevention, Rehabilitation
And Post-Release Care (PRAC) Programme
In the aftermath of a wave of terrorist
attacks beginning in 2003, Saudi Arabia launched its own indigenously developed
form of counter-radicalization campaign. The Saudi approach has been to combat
intellectual and ideological justifications provided by violently extreme
jihadist organizations for carrying out terrorist attacks. The Saudi strategy
consists of three interconnected programmes aimed at Prevention, Rehabilitation
And Post-Release Care (PRAC).[64]
Although the jury is out over the
success of the Saudi counter-radicalization programmes, they are said to have
inspired similar campaigns in other countries facing the threat, including
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia approaches
counter-radicalization as a “war of ideas predicated on issues of legitimacy,
authority and religious permissibility”.[65]
The government regards extremists as victims of an “evil ideology”, and
considers many extremists as well-intentioned men who wanted to do good deeds.
By focusing on a correct understanding of religion, the state aspires to help
“misguided believers” return to the right path.
The Saudi approach emphasizes the defeat
of the ideological infrastructure that supports political violence and the
Saudi campaign is directed against ‘takfiri’ (declaring people apostates)
beliefs, rehabilitation of reclaimed offenders and post-release “care” to
prevent relapses. “It takes on these challenges through time-tested Saudi
policies such as co-optation, patronage and coercion.”
As part of the “prevention” component of
the strategy, hundreds of government-run programs, implemented through the
“guidance department” in the Ministry of Interior, are aimed at educating the
public about Islamic extremism and its dangers to society.[66]
In schools, universities and mass media,
recognized religious scholars and authorities disseminate the right religious
understanding to confront extremist propaganda. “The primary audience is not
extremists themselves, but the larger population that may sympathize with
extremists and those who do not condemn the beliefs that lead to extremism.”
When it comes to deradicalization of
extremists, the government heavily relies on the importance of religious
dialogue to address a detainee’s misconceptions about Islam. However in recent
years, new emphasis is laid on modifying a detainee’s behavior and not just a change
in his or her religious beliefs. Thus, the programmes have diversified and
cover classes and counseling on sharia law, psychology, vocational training,
sociology, history, Islamic culture, art therapy, and athletics. Many of these
centers have updated classes on history and culture to counter the growing
influence of an alternative view of history and culture presented by Al-Qaeda.
As mentioned above the government has built special facilities (see above
Al-Ria’ya programme) for the incarceration and deradicalization of extremists,
separate from ordinary criminals detained in state prisons.
As part of its post-release programmes,
the government has expanded the role of a detainee’s family. “In addition to
visiting during the program and providing post-release support, family members
now provide input on how to design specialized programs for each detainee and
inform how his progress is evaluated. Center staff also use sequenced trial
releases with the families to observe how each party responds to the other,
assess the individual undergoing rehabilitation, and determine whether family
members will be capable of supervising him after release. This last element is
critical to ensure the family can help prevent a formerly violent extremist
from becoming a threat again.”[67]
Thus,
the PRAC strengthens social bonds during the rehabilitative process by
including a detainee’s family and offering social services to him and his
family. It promotes a bond between detainee and a state-sponsored cleric
to establish a new ideological framework through authority and trust. Then
again, in order address the social needs of a detainee, the Saudi Government
provides financial assistance in the form of lost salary, family healthcare,
and children’s schooling during the detainee’s incarceration.
After impressive success initially,
Saudi authorities accept recent setbacks in the face of a rise in the
recidivism rate among “deradicalized extremists” by as much as 10% to 20%. In
January 2009, authorities made the embarrassing announcement that at least eleven
former Guantanamo detainees returned to terrorist activity after graduating
from the Saudi program.[68]
Still, Saudi Arabia has developed a counter-radicalization programme that has
its admirers around the world and the government continues to refine the
process based on experience and fresh insights. One of its salient aspects is
that the program is not punitive in nature but is rather rehabilitative for the
“victims” of radicalization.
ii)
UK’s Preventing Violent Extremism (Prevent)
Strategy
The 5-million-pound
counter-radicalization ‘Prevent’ strategy constitutes one of the four Ps that
make up the British government’s post 9/11 counter-terrorism strategy,[69]
known as ‘CONTEST’: ‘Prepare’ for attacks, ‘Protect’ the public, ‘Pursue’
the attackers and ‘Prevent’ their radicalisation in the first place. The
policy was not very popular to begin with, but has become even more
controversial after the current government under Prime Minister David Cameron
revised it, with a new and more controversial approach.
In 2011, the British government
introduced the new version as an alternative to the supposed failure of the
previous policy that according to the new Home Secretary Theresa May was unable
to separate a policy of integration from that of counterterrorism. In its
critique to the earlier policy, the then newly elected Tory government averred
that greater integration in itself was not sufficient for countering
radicalization, but a successful strategy was needed to confront the ideologies
behind extremism and terrorism head on. Thus, ‘Prevent’ defines extremism as a
“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy,
the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance for
different faiths and beliefs.”[70]
However, this values-based definition of
ideology has been controversial and its critics claim it to be reflective of
the political discourse of right-leaning European political parties that reject
the concept of multiculturalism and see it as a failure. For example, Prime
Minister David Cameron is being criticized by some leaders of the British
Muslim community for arguing that Britons should confront multiculturalism with
“muscular liberalism.”[71]
Thus under ‘Prevent’, the main shift in the government’s strategy against
radicalization has been that it is targeting violent ideologies by asserting
its own ideology and by not confronting violent religious or ideological
organizations within the framework of their own avowed religious or ideological
paradigms.
Therefore, it is similar to the Saudi
PRAC in that it has taken an ideological “war of ideas” approach to spearhead
the counter-radicalization campaign, but is different from it in that it does
not seek to reclaim extremists by advocating the true or moderate teachings of
their religion or ideology, but by insisting that the radicalized do not revert
to their essential religious values but to British values of democracy and
human rights.
However since 2011, ‘Prevent’ has seen
conspicuous success in its counter-radicalization campaigns. Its team for
removing online extremist content has scrapped over 75,000 pieces of “unlawful
terrorist material” from the Internet.[72]
The government claims it has worked with
more than 250 mosques and 50 religious groups, has distributed over 20,000
leaflets and posters in various languages, which urge people against travelling
to Syria. Through its deradicalization programme called ‘Channel’, the
government uses psychologists, social activists and religious experts to advise
thousands of people considered susceptible to extremist ideas.[73]
However, Prevent has been the
most controversial ‘P’ of the other four in the CONTEST programme and has
become highly unpopular even among most members of the British Muslim
community. Its detractors criticize it for its inability to define
“radicalization”, for singling out the Muslim community in Britain at the expense
of British far-right White supremacist groups, for turning the former into a
“suspect” community, for its assertion that “radicalization” is the main driver
of violent extremism and terrorism, for monitoring and ‘spying’ over the
population and “arbitrarily” referring people to deradicalization programmes,
etc.
Some critics point out that the 50
million pound annual budget allocated for the programme has not been very
useful and may have further polarized British population and pushed
law-enforcement into the “pre-criminal” space. Others find Orwellian
underpinnings that could pose a threat to the values of democracy and civil
rights in the country.
d)
India’s Efforts at Developing
Appropriate Counter-Radicalization Measures
Although India has confronted
insurgencies and terrorist campaigns by various radicalized regional and
religious organizations in several parts of the country for decades, a
comprehensive policy for combating such problems at the ideological and
operational level has not been developed, possibly as the causes of such
threats have largely been socio-political in nature, and not driven by purely
religious or ideological motivations. With the rise of militant Islamism, which
seeks to project its own version of Islam as a revolutionary socio-economic and
political antithesis to the modern geopolitical global world, the threat of
radicalization has gained utmost importance.
In this respect, India is “working out a
cohesive strategy to counter attempts at radicalization and recruitment,”
suitable in the Indian context.[74]
Various measures like counselling of “vulnerable and radicalized” youths as
well as their families and propagating “moderate” interpretations of Islam to
counter the IS ideology of violent extremism are being developed. Various
measures like an “extremist counseling hotline”, set up recently by Austria,
has reportedly drawn the interest of Indian authorities.[75]
The viability of the US’ counter-radicalization programmes focused on community
outreach and UK’s Prevent and Channel programmes in the Indian context is being
considered. It seems Indian authorities have been wary of introducing highly
intrusive and controversial forms of surveillance and de-radicalization
measures, as they have recently proven quite controversial in countries like
the UK.
At present, if the law enforcement
agencies in India find an individual to be a highly radicalized person, they
determine whether the person can be referred for de-radicalization. The person
receives counseling either by the police or scholars of the ideological or
religious affiliation to which the individual belongs. The person’s activities
are monitored to prevent recidivism. These measures are currently in place in
the states of Maharashtra and Telangana.[76]
Currently, the center and state
governments in India are building their own set of counselors and religious
experts, community leaders and elders, as well as civil society members to be
engaged in the de-radicalization process. Community outreach programmes by
security agencies reaching out to schools and colleges, as well as the setting
up of help-lines are being developed.[77]
I.
Extremist Fiction and Developing
Effective Counter-Narratives
“Insanity in
individuals is something rare - but in groups, parties, nations and epochs, it
is the rule.”[78]
-
Friedrich Nietzsche
-
a)
The Evolution of Extremist
Ideologies
The subject of
radicalization cannot be discussed in the absence of identifying some of the
radical ideologies that are fuelling the problem of violent extremism and
terrorism in the world. In fact, the US administration under President George
W. Bush had itself renamed the so-called “war on terror” with the slogan “a
global struggle against violent extremism”[79].
Most extremist and terrorist
organizations of today are the offshoots of certain political and or religious
revivalist/reactionary movements that came into existence in recent centuries,
mostly deemed deviant by the traditional schools of their faith or political
schools of origin.[80]
Thus, the global campaign against extremism and terrorism is to be understood
as essentially a war against certain radicalized and politically motivated socio-political
or crypto-religious movements and is not directed against any community or
religion.
Much like the rise of
anarchism, fascism and communism of the 19th-20th
centuries, the biggest threat to global peace and security in the early 21st
century has come from extreme religio-political movements (particularly global
jihadism).[81]
After stripping religions of much of their spiritual trappings and mythological
baggage, these crypto-religious movements have sought to remodel their faiths
along the lines of modern political mass movements, and seek to establish
theocracies based on their religious laws and precepts as an alternative to the
mainly liberal, secular and democratic order of the international community.
Prominent among these
extreme religious movements has the Islamism-inspired jihadist-Salafi
movement (which began in the late 18th
and 19th centuries with its violent opposition to all schools of
Islamic Shariah, both Sunni and Shiite[82])
and the Shiite theocratic model based on Khomeini’s expansion of the concept of
Vilayat-e-Faqih[83].
b)
The Extremist Narrative
In order to justify
their mixing of religion with politics and militarism, many of these extremist
movements have concocted devious religio-political narratives, which need to be
carefully studied and analyzed in order to then develop effective counter-narratives
against them.
According
to British Prime Minister David Cameron, the “root cause” of terrorism is the
extremist narrative and not foreign policy or poverty.[84]
In this context, let us understand the nature and role of an extremist
narrative. Extremist narratives do not encompass the core philosophy of a
radical ideology, whose minutiae remain vague to most of its followers. It is
also not a fully codified canon assembled in one place, but is diffuse and
woven around supposedly “inviolable” values, associated concepts and even
smaller rationally constructed arguments. More important, it highlights the
“evils” and the “shortcomings” of the rival communities or established order.
Thus, a radical narrative refers to a series of justifications and arguments in
defence of the supposed principles and values of an extremist ideology, and
accusations against the prevailing order which necessitates its violent
destruction.
Often, radical
extremists begin by exposing a real or perceived flaw in the prevailing
socio-political order, one that has a high possibility of resonating with the
targeted section of a population. The purpose is to create a cognitive
dissonance, particularly among the young, impressionable and vulnerable members
of that community. Thereafter, other radical ideas are gradually introduced and
slowly the full extremist dose is administered into the bloodstream of a
neophyte recruit. It is this cleverly constructed emotional and rational
exposition of dubious values and concepts that form an extremist narrative,
which eventually radicalizes a credulous person into a full-blown extremist.
Narratives are of
various kinds. Almost all radical ideologies follow the same set of narratives,
and at times they can be easily interchanged by just removing the idiomatic
expressions and phraseology belonging to one with the other. Some of these
narrative strands are as follows:
i)
The Persecution Complex: To
begin with, almost all extremist narratives are very high on emotional content
and rather short on intellectual merit or historical accuracy. They
overdramatize any real or perceived insult or injury to the community’s
religious and cultural identity, values and heritage at the hands of a foreign
aggressor and evil collaborators from within the community.[85]
There is always a feeling of grand conspiracy against the community that
demands the need for decisive action from the silent and insensate majority.
Incontrovertibly, decisive action becomes a euphemism for acts of violence.
This so-called conspiracy is often contextualized in historic, if not
primordial terms and an entire alternate historical narrative is developed in stark
black and white paradigms.
ii)
Nostalgia for an Imagined Past: Most
extremist narratives hearken back to an age of pristine purity when the
supposedly persecuted religious community was at a presumed apogee of its
spiritual and material achievements because of its proximity to the divine and
its complete adherence to a sacred ethical code, in sharp contrast to the
morally degenerate members of the day. To the Muslim extremists, for example,
this was the time of the ‘Salaf’ (the first three generations of Islam) from
which Salafism derives its name. This nostalgia forces many of these
organizations to try to reverse the course of history in order to take it back
to ancient and medieval times.
iii)
The Call to Action and Bogey of
Martyrdom: All extremist and terrorist organizations call
members of their community to action against an existential threat to their
community. They demand unquestioning loyalty to the leadership and a commitment
to offer the supreme sacrifice for which they would be more than adequately
compensated in the afterlife. In fact, ‘matyrdom’ is championed as the peak of
a person’s spiritual ascension, a consummation devoutly to be wished. It is for
this reason most violently extreme religious groups and terrorist organizations
turn into death cults, even doomsday cults.[86]
iv)
Demonizing ‘The Other’: To
all extremist organizations truth is spelt with a capital T. They then separate
the presumed untruth practiced by other communities by demonizing them as the
‘Other’ and by painting them with a broad black brush.[87]
In waging a campaign against a so-called ‘enemy
community’, they cannot afford to project the rival culture or people in 50
shades of grey as that would jeopardize their campaign against it.
v)
The Supremacist and Panacea
Construct: Most extremist narratives envy the
scientific growth and progress of the modern world and claim that their
communities were the progenitors of science and civilization. The modern world
is said to have somehow stolen their pristine knowledge and technological
prowess and has created a world of immorality, corruption and outright decadence.
Therefore, it is either the Aryan race, the Jewish intellect, or the Muslim
faith which is projected as an invincible force which will ultimately prevail.
Again, most extremists aver that they have answers to all the ills facing
modern civilization.
vi)
The Armageddon and the Blissful
Afterlife: Many extremist groups depend on some
dubious religious literature and reinterpret it to claim their own prominence
in shaping their community’s future. Some of them, such as the ISIS, imagine
taking part in a prophesized end-of-the-world Armageddon by fancifully
interpreting some Hadeeth literature. Again, the ultimate goal of all extremist
movements is to achieve the blissful land of their dreams. For the radical Jews
it is Zion of the Mashiach, for Evangelical Christians the 1000 year Millennial
Kingdom of Jesus, for fundamentalist Muslims it is the Caliphate of Imam Mahdi
and Eisa Maseeh and even for the Communist it is the Utopia of a stateless
society. These wonderful predictions of the future are meant to seduce the
credulous into fighting for the community with overzealous optimism.
It is easy to develop
convincing counter-narratives against most of these extremist ideological
strands as they are usually based on weak or false religious traditions and
ideological sources.
c)
How to Develop Effective
Counter-Narratives
In order to develop
effective counter narratives, what is known as a “strategic rhetoric”, three
components could prove very useful, as enunciated by Aristotle in his great
philosophical treatise the ‘Rhetoric’.[88]
First is the Ethos, which
means the credibility of the actors or channels of communication delivering the
message. For example, a government servant asking a radical to change his ways
may not be as effective a communicator as that of a reclaimed terrorist or a
religious scholar.
The second component in
any counter-narrative is the Logos, which means the message
itself, its authenticity and how effective or rationally coherent it is in its
claims.[89]
The third aspect is Pathos,
which refers to the deep emotional resonance and cultural connect in the
language and cadence of the message in order to influence the target audience.
These days, subtle ways of subliminal messaging has been developed into an
artform, which extremist groups like the ISIS, employ to great effect. Perhaps,
it is time that anti-extremist counter-narratives also employ the art.
Clearly, any counter
narrative or PR exercise needs to develop a variety of carefully formulated
counter-narratives, developed by several experts on the subject, and needs to
be disseminated through different agencies of transmission suitable for
delivering the message to clearly designated sections of the target audience.
For example, if we wish
to spread the message against extremist organizations in the country, we would
have to at least target the five usual channels of recruitment.
a) Places
of worship and seminaries
b) Centers
of Extremist organizations
c) Community-dominated
areas and forums
d) Prisons
e) Cyberspace
Here let us also look
into the various agencies that could be involved in delivering
counter-radicalization messages. These might include:
∙
Govt Agencies
∙
NGOs
∙
Media Outlets, Both Print and Electronic
∙
Private Sector Organizations
(particularly, Public Relations and Advertising companies)
∙
Internet and Social Media Campaigners
∙
Victims of Terrorism
∙
Reformed Extremists or Reclaimed
Offenders
∙
Religious Leaders of Eminence (Both in
India and Abroad)
∙
Religious Organizations
∙
Anti-Radical Propaganda Experts at
Schools, Seminaries, Jails, Public Institutions, etc.
∙
Local community leaders for monitoring
and informing government of any radical elements operating in the neighborhood.
d)
Types of Counter Narratives
Now we come to the
important types of counter-narratives that can be developed as effective tools
of counter radicalization.[90]
i)
Positive Narrative:
Before developing counter-narratives to fight extremism we need to first
strengthen and reinvigorate the national narrative by propagating our core
constitutional values, of democracy, pluralism and secularism. We need to
develop a national vision so that every citizen knows how he/she would benefit
from and contribute to the country’s goals so that they feel they have a stake
in it.
ii)
Amplify Doctrinal and Ideological
Fissures: Some of the extremist narratives highlighted above
reject orthodox schools of classical religion. Therefore, their claims of
religious legitimacy can be easily discredited by highlighting their doctrinal
deviance.
iii)
The Semantics-Savvy
Counter-Narrative: It is important that we do not use the
words and terminologies of the extremists in our literature, let alone
counter-narratives. For example, we better not use the word ‘Jihadis’ for
Muslim terrorists. On hearing this, the uneducated and impressionable Muslim
believes that the so-called ‘Jihadis’ are fighting a legitimate, religious war.
Meanwhile, non-Muslims tend to get the idea that terrorism and Jihad are
synonymous and start hating Islam and Muslims. Instead of calling Muslim
terrorists as Jihadis, Mahmood Madani, the leader of Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind calls
them ‘Fasadis’ (seditionists). Similarly, Sheikh Tahirul Qadri calls all Muslim
terrorists as the followers of the ‘Khawarij’, an outcast sect thrown out of
the fold of Islam after its members had assassinated Caliph Ali. By
dissociating the name Jihadi from the description of the Muslim terrorist, we
would discredit their campaign which is principally anti-Islamic. Therefore,
the use of semantics is very important in any counter-radicalization campaign.[91]
iv)
Strategic Counter Narratives:
In times of extreme stress following a terror attack or communal violence,
carefully prepared messages need to be delivered to stop large sections of the
population and its communities from becoming polarized and radicalized by the
incident.
v)
Ethical Counter-Narratives: We
need to disseminate the message that all religions are opposed to terrorism and
that the Pope, the Great Sankaracharyas and Imam of the Holy Kaaba have
condemned the actions of all religious extremist and terrorist organizations.
vi)
Specialized Religious or
Ideological Counter Narratives: On specialized and
controversial legal or history-related issues, top experts need to devise
specific counter-narratives to be disseminated through various agencies. Some
extremists speak against global economic and political systems and criticize it
on scholastic grounds. Such narratives must be refuted by experts in the
subject.
vii)
Tactical Counter Narratives: Sometimes
material that may discredit the leadership or members of extremist organization
should be used to make such groups unpopular.
viii)
The Humor and Sarcasm Narrative:
At times the use of humor and sarcasm to make fun of extremist leaders, their
mannerisms and their speeches could prove an effective way of bring down their
popularity.
ix)
Subliminal Messaging: Advertising
agencies and filmmakers are experts in communicating subliminal messages to
their audience. Their expertise should be used in disseminating
counter-narratives.[92]
II.
Recommended Social and
Institutional Changes in India
“The roots of violence:
Wealth without work, pleasure without conscience, knowledge without character,
commerce without morality, science without humanity, religion without sacrifice
and politics without principle.”[93]
-
Mahatma Gandhi
Based on the above
study, this paper recommends the following contours for an effective and
comprehensive counter-radicalization programme for Indian administrative
authorities.
a)
The role of civil society could prove
crucial in fighting the growing threat of radicalization in India. The wider
reach and informal approach of its programmes could prove more effective and
garner greater trust among vulnerable communities than government sponsored
programmes could. Civil society’s role in countering radicalization can foster
a sense of belonging and shared identity and reduce real and perceived
isolation among members of vulnerable communities and bridge internal community
divisions. Thus, its role is vital in law enforcement, citizenship teaching,
inter-faith dialogue, cohesion activities, language tuition,
anti-discrimination projects, myth busting, housing and integration policies,
improving educational attainment, mentoring and developing role models.[94]
b)
There is a need to empower the moderate
voice among all communities in order to separate radicals from the general
population through effective homegrown community outreach programs. An
even-handedness in taking strict action against extremist organizations of all
denominations is the need of the hour, even if they do not overtly engage in
violent activities. Such organizations often function as fronts or breeding
grounds for raising radical cadres.
c)
Again, the singling out of any community
for counter-radicalization or de-radicalization referrals would only prove
counterproductive as it would lead to greater divisiveness and radicalization,
something the programmes are supposed to confront in the first place. Extremism
often feeds itself off on both sides of the spectrum and gradually squeezes out
the moderate voice in an escalating standoff. Therefore, counter-radicalization
strategies should encompass all vulnerable communities in the country, unlike
some aforementioned programmes in the West that have become highly
controversial.
d)
There is also the need to track down the
channels for the funding of certain religious organizations that may be
spreading the poison of radicalization and the use of other forms of legal
measures to curtail their actions aimed at fomenting communal discord or
facilitating acts of violent extremism and terrorism.
e)
At the administrative level, there is a
need to check growing politicization of religion across the political spectrum
by stringent implementation of existing laws and strict compliance of the code
of conduct during elections.
f)
Instances of communal violence should
not be taken lightly or dismissed as incidents typical to a united, but
dysfunctional family. India already has a highly radicalized population divided
along communal and casteist lines. Serious thought must be given to preventing
violent outbreaks, in times when foreign non-state actors are increasing their
seditious activities in the country.
g)
Public perception across various
communities regarding fairness and impartiality of security agencies and the
judicial system in times of communal violence needs to improve. When members of
any community start losing faith in the country’s law enforcement agencies it
becomes more radicalized and some of its members start attacking state
institutions itself and join foreign extremist groups.
h)
In addressing the problems faced by the
minority communities, one cannot neglect the legitimate concerns and problems
faced by the so-called majority community. Political parties should thus be
wary of giving precedence to national interest before indulging in so-called
minority appeasement or majoritarian populism.
i)
Anti-radicalization,
counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs should be developed based
on the country’s socio-cultural conditions and requirements. In this respect,
more specialized wings in think tanks and relevant government departments have
to be developed and competent personnel and facilities have to be groomed for
implementing in our prisons, religious seminaries, schools, colleges etc., as
far as possible.
j)
There is a need to introduce Religious
Studies as a secular academic discipline in our universities, so that the false
religious indoctrination of foreign extremist groups through the Internet could
be countered and authorities may not have to depend on biased, opinionated and
quack religious scholars to frame the country’s counter-narratives and
de-radicalization policies.
k)
The importance of developing a strong
counter-radicalization presence in the cyber world cannot be understated,
particularly in the country’s regional languages in which the ISIS and Al-Qaeda
are gradually spreading their message.
l)
Smart, non-controversial policies to
reverse the process of communal segregation in our cities and towns are in
order. Again, community elders and leaders need to be involved for purposes of
monitoring, surveillance and guidance of the young and impressionable members
from falling into the trap of extremism.
m)
There is a need to incorporate the
subject of ethics in our school syllabi, which could teach universal values,
such as respect for people of different religions or ways of life, the respect
for women in society, the avoidance of indecent language and conduct (which is
now becoming all too common in our social and political discourse), the
importance of honesty against the evil of corruption, and obviously the dangers
and horrors of violence and destruction, etc. The problem is there are too many
socially challenged IT nerds, engineering geeks and outright criminals joining
the ranks of extremists these days, which perhaps needed proper ethical
schooling to begin with.
n)
At a general level, the country seems to
be struggling to come up with a new national vision, a modern syncretism and
cultural renaissance, a new composite identity that could define its character
in the 21st century and beyond. As the materialistic angst caused by
the modern world is forcing people to seek intellectual, aesthetic and
spiritual solace, they are increasingly falling into the trap of fake godmen
and terrorists. In the face of cultural challenges, incidents of extreme
violence and bestiality are increasing, a problem that the British poet WH Auden
put succinctly: “When words lose their meaning, physical forces take over.”[95]
As the threat
of terrorism is a sui generis phenomenon, with its origins, scope and impact
extending beyond conventional security and military paradigms, covering several
ideological, religious, socio-political, economic and at times historical
vectors, a purely militaristic and security-centric response to the threat has
over the years proven inadequate and in some cases counterproductive.
Therefore, there is a clear need for
developing effective counter-radicalization approaches and measures to drain
the swamp of radical extremism in order to combat this hideous national
security threat.
Some of the
counter-radicalization programmes and measure detailed in this paper
necessitate further study and empirical study in order to develop a carefully and
comprehensively charted blueprint for an overarching counter-radicalization
policy − with the involvement of all central and state governments, important
think tanks and experts related to the field, as well as influential leaders of
all communities − has to be charted and judiciously implemented to counter the
dangerous menace of radicalization facing India.
Notes
[2] Rik
Coolsaet (Ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and
American Experience, 2nd edition (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 240.
[3]
Minerva Nasser-Eddine, Bridget Garnham, Katerina Agostino and Gilbert Caluya, Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review (Canberra: Australian Government,
Department of Defence March 2011), p. 13.
[4]
Dutch Security Service (AIVD), 2005.
[6] A.
S. Wilner and C. J. Dubouloz, "Homegrown terrorism and transformative
learning: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization," Global
Change, Peace & Security (formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security
& Global Change) 22:1 (2010): 38.
[7]
Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social
Science Theories." Journal of Strategic
[8]
Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, The University of South Florida,
2004.
[10]
Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social
Science Theories." Journal of Strategic
Security 4, no. 4 (2011)
[11] S.
Atran, "Pathways to and From Violent Extremism: The Case for Science-Based
Field Research," Statement before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats & Capabilities, March 10, 2010.
[12] L.
Bokhari, T. Hegghammer, B. Lia, P. Nesser, and T. Tonnessen, "Paths to
Global Jihad: Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terror Networks," FFI
Seminar hosted by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (Kjeller,
Norway), March 15, 2006.
[14] J.
Horgan, presentation at START conference, University of Maryland (1 September
2011). Video- recorded by START.
[16] John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to
Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into Terrorism,” Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (forthcoming); John
Horgan, “Deradicalisation or Disengagement? Perspectives on Terrorism,” Volume
II, Issue 4; and John Horgan, “Individual Disengagement: A Psychological
Perspective,” in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind,
NY (New York/London: Routledge, 2009).
[17] Andy Fitzgerald, ‘Being labeled a radical is meant to be an insult. History tells us otherwise’, The Guardian, 20 January 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/20/we-need-radicals-for-social-change
[18] Dr.
Alex P. Schmid; Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A
Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review; ICCT Research Paper, March 2013
[20]
Arun Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation: the journey of a concept’, Race & Class,
Vol. 54, No. 2 (Oct.-Dec. 2012), p. 3.
[21]
Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social
Science Theories." Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011)
[22] Dr. Alex P. Schmid; Radicalisation,
De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and
Literature Review; ICCT Research Paper, March 2013
[23]
Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, The University of South Florida,
2004
[24]
Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 115.
[25]
Stefan Malthaner, The Radical Milieu, (Bielefeld: Institut für
interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung (IKG), November 2010), p. 1;
[26]
Defining Terrorism & its Root Causes. References to the definition of
terrorism and the root causes as discussed in the United Nations General
Assembly debate ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism’, 1 – 5 October,
2001, United Nations, New York.
[27]
A.P. Schmid (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London:
Routledge, 2011), pp. 272-79
[29] J.
Githens-Mazer and R. Lambert, "Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization
Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse," International Affairs 86
(2010)
[30] G.
H. McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," Annual Review of
Political Science 6 (2003): 473–507.
[31] Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror
Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004),
[32]
Dalgaard-Nielsen, Ania, "Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I: The
Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory," Danish Institute for
International Studies (DIIS) (Copenhagen), 2008.
[33]
Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the West (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005).
[34] C.
R. McCauley and M. E. Segal, "Social psychology of terrorist groups,"
in C. Hendrick (ed.), Group processes and intergroup relations: Review of
personality and social psychology (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987): 231–256.
[35]
Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, The University of South Florida,
2004.
[36] G.
W. Allport, "The historical background of social psychology," in G.
Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), Handbook of social psychology (New York:
Random House, 1954), 5.
[37] L.
R. Rambo, Understanding religious conversions (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1993).
[38] J.
Lofland and N. Skonovd, "Conversion motifs," Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 20 (1981): 376.
[39]
Walter Laqueur, End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New
York: Continuum, 2003).
[41] C.
McCauley and S. Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of political radicalization:
Pathways toward terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence (2008):
416.
[42] “Malala Yousufzai: Our Books And Pens Are The Most Powerful Weapons,” Education, The Guardian, 12 July 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/12/malala-yousafzai-united-nations-education-speech-text
[44]See John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes:
Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into Terrorism,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science (forthcoming); John Horgan,
“Deradicalisation or Disengagement? Perspectives on Terrorism,” Volume II,
Issue 4; and John Horgan, “Individual Disengagement: A Psychological
Perspective,” in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind,
NY (New York/London: Routledge, 2009).
[46]
Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and
Extremism that Lead to Terrorism. The coChairs are the Executive Office of The SecretaryGeneral (EOSG), the United
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), and the
1267 Monitoring Team. Other Working Group Members include the Counterterrorism
Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the Department of Political Affairs
(DPA), the Department of Public Information (DPI), the International Criminal
Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO).
[47]
From the response of Norwegian Government to the 18 February United Nations
CTITF letter, received on 27 March, 2008.
[48]
Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and
Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, 2008
[49]
Cuthbertson I.M 2004, “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists‟, World Policy
Journal, vol.21, no.3
[50]
Alexandra Klausner, “US Prison camp in Iraq accidentally formed ISIS by housing
the most radial jihadists together and allowing them to organize terror group,”
The Daily Mail, 31 May 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3104859/US-Prison-camp-Iraq-accidentally-formed-ISIS-housing-radial-jihadists-allowing-organize-terror-group.html#ixzz3xCY5nfmE
[51] UK Department of Education, “Protecting Children From Radicalisation: The Prevent Duty”, 1 July 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protecting-children-from-radicalisation-the-prevent-duty
[53] ICP: Islamic Charities Project (formerly known as the Montreux Initiative), Center on Conflict Department and Peacebuilding), http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp/ccdp-research/clusters-and-projects-1/religion_politics/islamic-charities-project.html
[54]
Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and
Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, 2008
[55]
ibid
[56]
ibid
[57]
National Coordinator For Counterterrorism (NCTb), “Jihadis and the Internet,”
Ministries of Justice and interiors, the Netherlands, 2007
[59] Olivia Siong, “New Helpline, Guidebook to Counter Isis Propaganda, Radical Ideology,” Channel News Asia, 09 June 2015 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/new-helpline-guidebook-to/1902416.html
[60]
Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and
Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, 2008
[61]
Tsoukala Anastassia, “Democracy Against Security: the debates about
CounterTerrorism in the
[62]
Report of the coChairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and
Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, 2008
[63]
ibid
[64]
Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy:
Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare”, Middle East Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2008
[65]
Ibid
[66]
ibid
[68]
ibid
[70]
Theresa May, “Prevent Strategy,” Her Majesty’s Government, 2011, 107
[71] “State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron”, BBC News website, 05 February 2011
[73]
ibid
[75]
Ibid
[77]
ibid
[78]
Friedrich Nietzsche, Aphorism 156, Beyond Good and Evil
[80] HA Hellyer, ‘Colonialism
fuelled modern forms of extremism’, The National, August 9, 2014
[81]“Islamist
Terrorism From 1945 to the Rise of ISIS,” Constitutional Rights Foundation, http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/islamist-terrorism-from-1945-to-the-death-of-osama-bin-laden.html
[83] “Islam in Iran: The Roots
of Political Shi’ism,” Encyclopedia Iranica,
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/islam-in-iran-x-the-roots-of-political-shiisms
[90] “Developing Effective
Counter-Narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism,” International
Center for Counter Terrorism, the Hague, September 2014
[91] Dr BB T. Van Ginkle
LLM, “Responding to Cyber Jihad: Towards
an Effective Cyber Jihad” ICCT Research Paper, March 2015
[92]
Ibid
[93] Mahatma Gandhi, Young India,
22 October, 1925
[95] W. H. Auden, The Art of
Poetry No. 17, Interviewed by Michael
Newman, The Paris Review
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