The SCO Summit: A Growing Coalition of ‘Frenemies’?

Published in WION website on June 9, 2017

To its Western detractors, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an emergent anti-NATO coalition, “an OPEC with bombs” and a military and economic alliance to be reckoned with.

To its Eastern proponents and supporters, the SCO is a military and economic coalition of mostly Central Asian countries (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), which after the expected inclusion of India and Pakistan as full members at the grouping’s annual summit in Astana today, would make it represent half the world’s population and almost 20 percent of its GDP.

Founded in 2001, the alliance’s three stated aims are to fight terrorism, extremism and separatism. In addition, members of the group also engage in economic and scientific cooperation.

But all eyes today, along with a few raised eyebrows, will be fixed on the admission of India and Pakistan as full member states into the SCO. Although chances of a meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Pakistan premier at the summit appear bleak, there are reports that a head-to-head between Mr Modi and the Chinese President Xi Jinping could be the highlight.  India is understandably less sanguine about its role in the coalition, thanks to the growing clout of some of its ‘frenemies’ in the bloc.

One of the stumbling blocks which India will likely face is the SCO member states’ expected endorsement of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which connects it to Europe and Africa and covers nearly 70 countries through a series of trade pacts. Delhi believes the BRI violates its sovereignty, particularly the proposed China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which runs through Pak-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan region (both an integral part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir). It should be noted that India did not participate in the BRI summit held in Beijing in mid-May, which drew 30 heads of state.

Again, there are differing views over terrorism and territoriality between India on the one hand, as well as China and Pakistan on the other. Beijing still considers Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh a disputed territory, remains adamant on preventing Masood Azhar’s naming in the UN sanctions list and obstructs India’s entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore, some Indian strategists contend that becoming part of the SCO and the so-called consensus-driven ‘Shanghai spirit’, could potentially imperil India’s vital interests.

There are also concerns that India-Pakistan disputes at the forum could render the bloc flaccid (SAARC serves as the precedent) and for this reason SCO member states have already instructed the two new entrants to keep their differences aside in the spirit of the SCO Charter, which prohibits the raising of bilateral issues. Thus, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying has reportedly said: “Hope India and Pakistan strictly follow the charter of the SCO and the idea of good neighbourliness to uphold the SCO spirit, improve their relations and inject new impetus into the development of the SCO.”

Some Indian experts fear that the strong Chinese and now growing Russian ties with Pakistan will not allow them to take the Islamic Republic to task over its increased support to cross-border terrorism and separatism in Jammu and Kashmir, but instead may use the SCO to force India into negotiating with Pakistan on Kashmir in the context of ‘good-neighborliness’.

In spite of these issues, India would benefit from greater connectivity and influence with Central Asian countries, and this development is likely to facilitate a Free Trade Agreement with European Economic Union (EEU), enabling an easy flow of raw materials, goods, finance and technology.

Again, the opening of the International South Transport Corridor (INSTC) — the 7,000 km long network of ship, rail and road route for moving goods connecting India, Russia, Iran, Europe and Central Asia — and the proposed Chabahar project in Iran would get a boost by India’s joining the coalition.

Even more important, India might gain from SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). In March this year, the anti-terror charter of SCO was bolstered when officials of special services of member states approved a draft convention on combating extremism and terrorism at a meeting in Tashkent. Again, the participation in SCO’s counter-terror exercises and military drills with member countries could prove useful for Indian forces. However, it is difficult to foresee India and Pakistani forces participating in bilateral anti-terror exercises under the SCO ambit. India could also benefit from an SCO ‘Energy Club’, particularly when Iran would likely join the grouping at a later date.

The SCO could also provide an opportunity to India to establish stronger ties with other Central Asian countries, for example with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to circumvent the influence of China-Pakistan alignment that could impede India’s direct access to Eurasia.

Some Western observers believe that Russia is trying to take advantage of India-China rivalry by getting India inducted into the SCO. It is contended that Moscow is wary of Beijing’s growing clout within the bloc and in a region that Russia views as its backyard. Some observers see signs of Russian unease with growing Chinese investment in Central Asia and reduced economic dependence of the region on the Russian largesse. It is in this context that Russia is said to have objected to any free trade agreement among the SCO members and wants the entry of India — with its large economic mite — to mitigate growing Chinese influence.

Thus, the inclusion of new members into the SCO could make the organization stronger by virtue of more resources (people and aggregate GDP), but could also make it more vulnerable given the divergence of security and economic interests among its member states. 

ET TU, BRUTE? AFTER SHIA IRAN, THE SUNNI STAB AT WAHHABISM

Published in WION website on October 14, 2016

They say when it rains, it pours. But no one could have predicted this new storm for the Wahhabi state of Saudi Arabia. 

The country's list of recent woes is pretty impressive; the US support for the regime has dwindled visibly, there have been consistent ISIS attacks, Iran continues to be a threat, and to add to all these, there is an economic recession as well as the waxing of ‘Shia Crescent’ in the neighbourhood. But the real bolt has come from the ‘Honourable University of Al-Azhar,’ whose scholars recently 'excluded' Salafi-Wahhabism from Sunni Islam. Historically speaking, the Salafi movement of the 1960s-70s gradually subsumed the Wahabi ideology to the effect that adherents of Wahhabism today call themselves Salafis, even though they practise a more puritan form of Islam than mainstream Salafi Muslims.

Established in Cairo in 975 AD, Al-Azhar is one of the world’s oldest extant universities and Sunni Islam’s most prestigious academic institution. The fatawa (edicts) of its clerics are held in high esteem, even if not observed to the letter, by most Sunnis around the world. On August 25-27, a delegation of eminent Al-Azhar scholars attended a conference held in Grozny (Chechnya) titled ‘Who are the Sunnis’. At the conference, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Ahmed el-Tayeb categorically renounced all forms of extremist and terrorist actions, saying that such deeds were incompatible with the teachings of Sunni Islam. 

Reportedly, in the same conference, the Shaikh also excluded the Salafi-Wahhabi movement from the sect of Ahlus Sunna (the Sunnis).

Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Ahmed el-Tayeb categorically renounced all forms of extremist and terrorist actions, saying that such deeds were incompatible with the teachings of Sunni Islam. 

The same omission was repeated in the final statement of the conference that limited the definition of Sunnis to 'Asharis, Maturidis by beliefs, followers of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi, Malaki, Shafai and Hanbali), and followers of pure Sufism in terms of ethics and chastity'. Conspicuously absent from this definition were names and terminologies associated with the Salafi-Wahhabi movement. 

The statement also refrained from mentioning any Saudi religious institutions. It restricted to consecrating only traditional non-Salafi Sunni academic institutions, namely Al-Azhar, The University of Al-Quaraouiyine (Fez, Morocco), Al-Zaytoonah University (Tunisia), Hadramaut University (Yemen) and some Russian universities. It is to be noted here that majority of Sunni Muslims in India belong to the Ashari and Maturidi systems of belief, including Deobandis and Barelvis, which were consecrated at the conference.

In their joint statement, the participants observed that the conference represented 'an important and necessary turning point to correct the sharp and dangerous deviation that has affected the concept of the Sunni community following attempts by extremists to seize and monopolise this title.' Scholars from over 100 countries including India, Russia, Syria, Turkey, Britain, etc. participated in the conference and were united in their stand against terrorism.

Scholars from over 100 countries including India, Russia, Syria, Turkey, Britain, etc. participated in the conference and were united in their stand against terrorism.

Speaking to the Middle East media website ‘Al-Monitor’, Prof Ahmad Karima of Al-Azhar University accused the Salafi-Wahhabi scholars of promoting the idea that they are the only real Sunnis to the exclusion of Ashari theology, which is adopted by Al-Azhar. He said, 'They (the Salafi-Wahhabis) even went further, deeming us non-believers in the Al-Masira Encyclopedia of Contemporary Religions, Sects and Parties (published by the Saudi World Assembly of Muslim Youth) … The Chechen conference was held to put things back in order, Sunnis are Asharis,' he stressed. 

In another interview, Ahmad Karima added, 'If the world is looking forward to uproot terrorism, it has to stand up against Wahhabism because they are the root of all sedition and conflict.'

The Wahhabi intellectuals and Saudi officials were predictably enraged by the final statement of the conference.  Saudi journalist Muhammad Al-Shaikh reportedly tweeted: 'Tayeb’s participation in the Grozny conference … will force us to change our behavior with Egypt. Our country is more important and Sisi’s Egypt shall go to hell.'

It is noteworthy that this internal Sunni feud came at a time when Saudi officials and their religious scholars were engaged in a bitter takfiri tirade with their Iranian counterparts on the eve of the Haj pilgrimage.  After Riyadh and Tehran failed to agree on terms governing the Hajj this year, Iranian President Ali Khamenei accused Saudi Arabia of 'murdering' Iranian pilgrims in last year’s Hajj stampede. He also called Saudis 'puny Satans who trembled in fear of … the Great Satan (the US).' In response, the Saudi Grand Mufti said: 'We have to understand that they (Iranians) are not Muslims. They are ‘Majus’ (in reference to Zoroastrians, the pre-Islamic religious community of Iran), and their enmity to Muslims – specifically to Sunni community – goes way back.'

However, it is ironic that the message of the Saudi Grand Mufti did not resonate with the non-Salafi Sunni community, which in turn started questioning the religious credibility of the Salafi-Wahhabi movement itself. As noted Middle East expert Juan R. Cole put it: 'Ironically, in the 18th century Wahhabis were the ones denouncing the Sunnis and attacking the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Through the centuries, the Wahhabis have gradually asserted that they are Sunnis themselves. But they did not start out that way.'

In fact, a nascent Sunni backlash against Salafi-Wahhabism seems to be gradually spreading across the world now; the non-Wahhabis Sunnis find relations with the Shiite community more acceptable, than with ‘ghair-muqallid’ (non-traditionalist) Wahhabis. For instance, Shias and Sunnis offered the second consecutive joint Eid Namaz at Imambara Shah Najaf at Lucknow in India recently. 

a nascent Sunni backlash against Salafi-Wahhabism seems to be gradually spreading across the world now

This was followed by an Eid Milan ceremony that invited Sikh and Hindu religious leaders. Meanwhile, there has been growing unease within the ruling Malaysian party UMNO over the rise of Salafi-Wahhabist extremism within its ranks. The secretary of the UMNO Veterans Association recently warned that a federal minister was using government facilities to spread the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology. This sense of alarm against the rise of Salafi-Wahhabism in Malaysia, which has until now allowed its spread unhindered, is a new development. Clearly, Sunni Muslims are becoming wary of being associated with 'Salafi-Wahhabi radicalism' that has spawned major jihadist organisations, like Al-Qaeda and the ISIS.

Apprehensive of the growing trend, several Islamic scholars and secular commentators stress that it would be wrong to directly equate Salafi-Wahhabi ideology with extremism or terrorism. They aver that majority of Wahhabis (over 80 per cent), who prefer to call themselves Salafis these days, are doctrinally apolitical and peace-loving; the jihadist strain only affects a small minority in that community. 

several Islamic scholars and secular commentators stress that it would be wrong to directly equate Salafi-Wahhabi ideology with extremism or terrorism.

The branding of Salafi-Wahhabis as non-Sunnis, non-Muslims or Muslim extremists by any community exacerbates religious polarisation leading to further alienation and radicalisation. They also warn against the potential rise of McCarthyism against Salafi-Wahhabi adherents by various societies and governments. Therefore, the solution to extremism and violence solely lies in religious tolerance and communal harmony, irrespective of any ethnic, racial or religious differences across the board.